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Agriculture is still the most important sector in driving economic growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries. In recent times, global agricultural food systems around 
the world are undergoing a rapid transformation with modern retailers, private standards, 
and vertically integrated supply chains gaining in importance. This transformation, which 
is partly driven by changes in consumer preferences, has led to a sharp increase in the 
production and trade of high-value foods such as fruits, vegetables, milk, meat, eggs, and 
fish. At the same time, the demand for luxury commodities such as coffee, tea, and cocoa 
that fulfill sustainability standards is also growing. In response, the number of 
sustainability standards is also growing, with the most common being Organic, Fairtrade, 
Rainforest Alliance, UTZ Certified, and CAFÉ Practices. The main emphasis of 
sustainability standards is on production systems that advance social equity and economic 
prosperity of producers, while maintaining or improving environmental quality. But what 
are the implications for smallholders in developing countries.   
Several studies have explored the impacts of different sustainability standards on for 
different crops in developing countries. Some of these studies are qualitative in nature. 
Other studies used quantitative techniques, but without accounting for non-random 
selection of farmers into certification schemes, means that the impact estimates may be 
biased. For sustainability standards in the coffee sector in particular, there are still only 
very few studies that properly control for selection bias; those that do, mostly assess the 
impact of only one standard, without comparing different standards and certification 
schemes. Furthermore, gender and nutrition effects of high-value food trade and 
modernization of supply chains remain almost unexplored. This is despite the high levels 
of malnutrition among smallholder farming communities and the fact that sustainability 
standards have a social component that goes beyond mere income effects.  
The first objective of this dissertation is to analyze the impacts of three sustainability 
standards — Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic — on the living standard and poverty of 
smallholder coffee farmers. The second objective is to estimate the nutrition impacts and 
nutrition impact pathways of sustainability standards among smallholder coffee farmers in 
Uganda. Since compliance with sustainability standards involves making investment 
decisions and investment decisions involve risk, the third objective of this study involves 
measuring risk attitudes of farmers. The specific objective is to compare different risk 




rates in the response behavior. The analyses of these objectives rely on two datasets that 
were collected in 2012. The first dataset consists of a comprehensive household survey 
comprising of 419 smallholder coffee farmers in Uganda. The second dataset consists of 
data collected from a framed field experiment that elicited risk preferences of 332 farmers, 
which is a sub-sample of the 419 farmers interviewed in the household survey.  
To analyze the first objective, we use survey data and propensity score matching with 
multiple treatments to control for selection bias. We find that farmers complying with all 
three sustainability standards have significantly higher living standards. However, 
disaggregation by certification scheme, Fairtrade certification improves living standards by 
30% and significantly reduces the likelihood of being poor by 50%. However, we also 
show that participation in UTZ and Organic certifications is not associated with higher 
living standards or lower poverty rates. Much of these differences in results are due to 
Fairtrade farmers receiving higher prices through a minimum guarantee system, having 
better bargaining power, and adding value to their certified coffee compared to the other 
two schemes. We conclude that overly general statements about the effects of standards on 
smallholder livelihoods may be misleading.  
For the second objective, again we use household survey data to analyze the impact of 
sustainability oriented certification on household nutrition, while controlling observed and 
unobserved factors using an instrumental variable approach. In addition, we have used 
structural equation modeling to identify the main nutrition impact pathways. Econometric 
results reveal that compliance with sustainability certification standards increases 
household calorie consumption by 19% and supply of micronutrients including iron and 
zinc by at least 35%. Furthermore, using structural equation modeling, we find that income 
and gender are the two main pathways to nutritional gains from sustainable certification. 
Participation in sustainability oriented certification leads to improved household nutrition 
through increased income and through improved bargaining power of women.  
We use experimental data to analyze the third objective of this research. The objective is to 
compare two innovative experimental methods that can be used in eliciting individual risk 
attitudes. The two methods were modified from the original lottery-choice experiments by 
replacing probabilities expressed in percent with images of bags of colored balls to 
represent probabilities of different payoffs in order to apply them to individuals in a rural 
developing country setting. The results show that both methods reveal high proportions of 




smallholder farmers in developing countries. We also find that observed inconsistency 
rates in the response behavior are relatively low compared to other studies in this field. The 
main policy highlight from this objective is that different risk elicitation methods may lead 
to different risk classification categories, which consequently may result in different policy 
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I. General Introduction  
1 Introduction  
Agriculture is still the most important sector in driving economic growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries. Eighty-percent of the estimated 500 million farms are 
managed by smallholders who contribute almost 80% of food supplies in Africa and Asia 
(IFAD & UNEP, 2013). Agriculture is inherently risky and associated with uncertainty 
over changes in the climate, high input prices, volatile output prices, institutional changes 
and increasing liberalization of global trade, with severe implications for smallholder 
vulnerability (Hurley, 2010; Vargas Hill, 2009). In recent times, global poverty and food-
insecurity in developing countries has been in the spotlight. Despite supplying a large share 
of global food supply, smallholders make up the majority of the 842 million people 
experiencing chronic hunger and undernourishment (FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2013). 
Although there have been modest successes, the progress in hunger reduction falls short of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which had targeted to halve the proportion 
of people under extreme hunger and poverty between 1990 and 2015. Growth in the 
smallholder sector plays a key role in contributing to poverty reduction in developing 
countries. 
Over the last couple of decades, major growth and structural changes in global agricultural 
food value chains have occurred. Trade liberalization, reduction in import barriers in 
industrialized countries and foreign direct investment have further contributed to 
agricultural economies opening up and increased economic integration of transition and 
developing countries. This trend has seen a sharp increase in the production and trade of 
high-value non-staple foods such as fruits, vegetables, milk, meat, eggs, and fish (Maertens 
& Swinnen, 2009; Reardon & Timmer, 2005; Swinnen, 2007). As a result, domestic 
agricultural food systems in developing countries are rapidly changing with the expansion 
of modern food supply chains with major implications for economic development. 
Supermarkets are also rapidly spreading across developing countries (Reardon, Timmer, 
Barrett, & Berdegue, 2003). At the same time, food production and trade are now 
increasingly being governed by stringent public and private standards regarding food 
quality and safety (Henson & Jaffee, 2006). In more recent times, there has been a rapid 
proliferation of sustainability standards, which are also private and voluntary standards, but 
with an emphasis on production systems that advance social equity and economic 
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prosperity of producers while maintaining or improving the environmental quality 
(Blackmore, Keeley, with Pyburn, R., E., Chen, & Yuhui, 2012). The most common and 
widely adopted sustainability standards are Organic, Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, UTZ 
Certified, and CAFÉ Practices. Despite these stringent standards, the share of high-value 
products traded from Asia and Latin America has doubled from 20% of agricultural 
exports since 1980 to around 40%, although the rates are slower in Africa (Swinnen, 
2014).  
It is generally agreed that global supply chains have had a profound effect on the way food 
is produced and traded, although there is still on-going debate on the implications for 
smallholder welfare in developing countries. Despite fears that high-value supply chains 
can contribute to the exclusion of poor farmers in developing countries due to the strict 
standards, modern supply chains are regarded as an important way of linking smallholder 
farmers to more stable and lucrative international markets. Smallholder farmers might 
potentially benefit from higher prices, improved quality, access to inputs, extension, and 
credit (Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2010a; Maertens, Colen, & Swinnen, 2009).  
Agriculture is inherently a risky sector. Investment decisions in farming are often made 
under risk and uncertain future returns. The growth in demand for high-value products and 
opening of agricultural economies has increased concern for the risks faced by smallholder 
farmers (Hill, 2009). On one hand, adopting private standards can be regarded as a risk-
reducing measure for smallholders because often they come with guaranteed output 
markets and product prices. On the other hand, participation in sustainability oriented 
certification, also involves investing in specialized pattern of production and such 
investments usually represent fundamental decisions for smallholder farmers as they are 
associated with uncertain future returns stemming from international price fluctuations and 
other vagaries of nature like crop and livestock diseases. Therefore understanding the risk 
attitudes and risk bearing capabilities of smallholders is therefore important policy.  
This research in this dissertation uses data collected from smallholder coffee farmers in 
Uganda and comprises of three analytical chapters. The dissertation focusses on analyzing 
the impact of participating in sustainability certification standards on smallholder welfare. 
Since participation in sustainability oriented certification is also linked with risk attitudes, 
this dissertation also analyzes risk attitudes of farmers using innovative experimental 
designs.    
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The first manuscript will analyze the impacts of three sustainability standards — Fairtrade, 
UTZ, and Organic — on the living standards and poverty levels among coffee farmers in 
Uganda. The second manuscript analyzes the nutrition impact of complying with 
sustainability standards and identifies the main nutrition impact pathways. The third 
manuscript will compare two different lottery designs used to elicit individual risk attitudes 
of coffee farmers in Uganda.  
1.1 The rise of high-value supply chains  
Due to the growing demand for high-value agricultural products, modern retailers, private 
standards, and vertically integrated supply chains are gaining in importance (Henson, 
Masakure, & Boselie, 2005; Reardon, Barrett, Berdegué, & Swinnen, 2009). Vertical 
integration of supply chains has resulted in private traders, international retailers, 
supermarkets, agribusinesses, and food processing companies increasingly engaging with 
smallholders in developing countries through contract farming (Swinnen & Maertens, 
2007). Contract farming is an arrangement with producers that is governed by private 
standards, which are a pre-defined set of rules or requirements that have to be complied 
with in order to have access to certain segments of a market. The growing demand for 
high-value products has been triggered by both demand and supply side factors.  
On the demand side, one of the major driving forces causing a shift towards high-value 
products is the change in consumer preferences and lifestyles. Some factors that have 
contributed to this change include rapid economic and income growth, higher living 
standards, higher education levels, increased urbanization and evolving lifestyles 
(Mergenthaler, Weinberger, & Qaim, 2009; Narrod et al., 2009). In addition, there have 
been growing fears among consumers over the need to secure food safety and quality. A 
series of heavily publicized foodborne disease outbreaks and incidents resulting from 
natural, accidental, and deliberate contamination of food,  have been described by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) as one of the major global public health threats of the 
21st century (WHO, 2007). This has raised attention among consumers, governments and 
food retailers on the need to monitor and control food production and distribution systems 
(Liu, Byers, & Giovannucci, 2008). Additionally, consumers in industrialized countries are 
increasingly becoming concerned with the possible social and environmental consequences 
of trade and food production systems. Thus, there is a segment of consumers willing to pay 
higher premiums for ethically produced goods in an effort to help poor farmers in 
developing countries out of poverty. Ethical consumers in this case are motivated by pure 
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altruism and the ‗warm glow‘ that comes with making a voluntary donation (Elfenbein & 
McManus, 2010).  
On the supply side, private voluntary standards were first introduced by big retailers and 
supermarkets in developed countries to respond to consumer concerns that included food 
safety and quality, traceability, health impact, human rights, animal welfare, labor 
standards and environmental, social and economic impacts (Ellis & Keane, 2008; Henson 
& Humphrey, 2010; Reardon, Henson, & Berdegue, 2007). In recent years, compliance 
with private standards is increasingly becoming a requirement for producers in developing 
countries, mainly because their domestic regulatory and control systems for ensuring food 
safety and quality are considered as weak. Therefore, large international retailers in 
conjunction with non-governmental organizations and independent certification bodies 
have established certification programs to accompany their standards. Furthermore, since 
most of the high-value foods traded are perishables like fresh fruits and vegetables, retail 
chains try to protect their reputation and market share by putting great emphasis on 
freshness, quality, and safety (Henson & Humphrey, 2010). 
Certification is now being used as a mechanism that reduces information asymmetries by 
making the attributes and origin of a commodity apparent to consumers and ensuring a 
larger degree of coordination, traceability, and monitoring along the commodity chain. 
Better coordination over the production process and control of input supplies and 
distribution can lead to cost savings and greater efficiency (Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005). 
Certified products usually display a logo or label that sends a signal to consumers that the 
product has complied with a certain standard.  
1.2 Implications of high-value supply chains on smallholders 
Although the increasing demand for high-value commodities is mostly driven by changing 
consumer preferences, it has far-reaching consequences on local producers and 
communities in developing countries. With modern supply chains becoming increasingly 
international, farmers who want to participate have to upgrade their production and 
processing systems, in order to comply with the stringent food quality and safety standards. 
Despite being regarded as voluntary, private standards are almost becoming mandatory, 
because many international buyers now consider them as a pre-requisite to do business in 
developing countries. These trends have many implications on the welfare of smallholders 
around the world.  
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On the one hand, there are growing concerns that due to tight product and production 
systems, smallholders might be excluded from high-value supply chains. A couple of 
reasons can explain why smallholders may not be able to consistently meet the highly 
stringent food standards. Smallholders are faced with many constraints that include (i) lack 
of access to production assets (land, labor and credit), (ii) existence of imperfect and 
incomplete markets, (iii) poor access to information, technology, extension and physical 
infrastructure, and (iv) smallholders are increasingly becoming vulnerable to a spectrum of 
challenges driven by adverse climatic conditions, declining productivity, high transaction 
costs, and price volatility (Minten & Reardon, 2008; Reardon et al., 2009; Swinnen, 2007). 
These constraints have been observed to cause smallholder farmers to be more risk averse 
and to pursue more subsistence-oriented objectives, further exacerbating their food 
insecurities and poverty (Dercon, 2009).  
In addition, other factors that might contribute to the exclusion of smallholders include 
high costs of obtaining initial certification and compliance. These costs may introduce a 
bias towards larger farms who can better exploit economies of scale and have the ability to 
supply in bulk (Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005). Vertically integrated supply chains may 
lead to producers being highly dependent on one or a few large buyers or retailers, thereby 
creating monopsony power that can also lead to unfavorable contract conditions (Swinnen 
& Vandeplas, 2012). Under such conditions, the risk of high-value product supply is often 
shifted unilaterally towards farmers.  
On the other hand, high-value supply chains also present opportunities for smallholders in 
developing countries. Through vertically integrated chains, international retailers, 
agribusiness firms and supermarkets enter into contract farming with smallholder farmers. 
Smallholder agriculture is characterized by product and price risks. Vertically integrated 
chains can be regarded as a market based risk management strategy, if market power can 
be avoided. Ideally, high-value supply chains and contracts ensure guaranteed access to 
output markets, fixed and stable prices and timely payments for farmers. Furthermore, 
farmers may benefit from the technical and institutional support that is sometimes provided 
in vertically integrated supply chains, thus reducing transaction costs, increasing 
productivity, and improving access to information and technology (Carletto, Kirk, Winters, 
& Davis, 2010; Henson et al., 2005; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009; Rao, Brummer, & Qaim, 
2012). Vertically integrated supply chains also create employment opportunities for rural 
communities especially in the processing and handling of high-value products (Rao & 
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Qaim, 2013). Women account for a large share of this type of employment, resulting in 
modern supply chains having a positive impact on gender dynamics at the household and 
community level (Maertens & Swinnen, 2012).  
1.3 Sustainability standards in coffee markets  
Sustainability standards are also increasingly being used by retailers and manufacturers, 
especially for luxury foods such as coffee, tea, or cocoa, to promote sustainability 
production systems among producers and to fulfill objectives for corporate social 
responsibility. Coffee ranks as one of the highly traded commodities on the international 
market, both in terms of volumes and value. It is estimated that the majority of the 25 
million global producers of coffee are smallholder farmers in developing countries whose 
livelihoods are directly dependent on coffee production (Calo & Wise, 2005; Fairtrade, 
2013). Consistent with global trends of high-value supply chains, the proportion of 
sustainability coffees is increasing, especially among consumers in Europe and the United 
States. In response to changing consumer preferences, major European retailers as well as 
other international organizations have developed private voluntary standards that 
differentiate and certify coffee produced under sustainability environmental and social 
conditions. The striking emergence and growth of sustainability coffee standards have seen 
them transform rapidly from being a niche market into the mainstream and growing at rates 
faster than any industry in recent years. In 2009, sustainably certified coffees accounted for 
about 8% of all global coffee sales, and this figure is projected to surge to 20-25% by 2015 
(Pierrot, Giovannucci, & Kasterine, 2010). Sustainability standards for coffee are viewed 
as instruments that reduce information asymmetries by making non-visible product and 
process attributes apparent to consumers and ensuring a larger degree of coordination, 
traceability, and monitoring along the commodity chain (Jena, Chichaibelu, Stellmacher, & 
Grote, 2012; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005). Due to the distinct production and marketing 
systems, certification schemes like Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic are seen as an important 
instrument in addressing chronic poverty through improved crop yields and product quality 
as well as cushioning farmers from volatile coffee prices (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011; Calo & 
Wise, 2005; Jena et al., 2012).  The Netherlands is leading the trend with 40% of the coffee 
consumed being certified, followed by the United States with a share of 16% (Pierrot et al., 
2010) 
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1.4 Problem statement 
Global trade, liberalization and the emergence of sustainability standards in high-value 
supply chains are transforming the way food systems in developing countries operate. 
There are growing debates and interests among researchers and policy makers on the likely 
impacts of smallholder participation in high-value supply chains, as well as on how 
behavioral aspects of farmers towards risk and uncertainty affects their production and 
marketing decision under different policy conditions. This dissertation analyzes the welfare 
impacts of farmers‘ compliance with sustainability standards using a household survey of 
coffee farmers in Uganda. In addition, it compares the results of two experimental designs 
that are commonly used in eliciting risk preferences. In the section below, we identify 
some gaps in the extant literature that motivated this dissertation.   
There is a growing body of literature analyzing the direct and indirect effects of different 
sustainability standards on the welfare of smallholder farmers in developing countries for 
different crops like coffee (e.g., Arnould, Plastina, & Ball, 2009; Blackman & Naranjo, 
2012; Bolwig, Gibbon, & Jones, 2009; Jena et al., 2012; Ruben & Fort, 2012), cocoa (e.g., 
Jones & Gibbon, 2011), banana (e.g., Fort & Ruben, 2008; Ruben & van Schendel, 2008; 
Zúñiga-Arias & Segura, 2008) and horticultural export crops like fresh fruits and 
vegetables (e.g., Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2010b; Carletto et al., 2010; Colen, 
Maertens, & Swinnen, 2012; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009). However, the number of 
standards is growing, especially for luxury commodities such a coffee, tea and cocoa. 
Different standards may have different impacts. For sustainability standards in the coffee 
sector, there are still only very few studies that properly control for selection bias; those 
that do, mostly assess the impact of only one standard, without comparing between 
different standards and certification schemes. We are not aware of any studies that 
compared the income and poverty effects of different sustainability standards in the same 
setting, using quantitative techniques and controlling for selection bias. Furthermore, the 
gender and nutrition effects of high-value food trade and modernization of supply chains 
remain almost unexplored. This is despite the high levels of malnutrition among 
smallholder farming communities and the fact that sustainability standards have a social 
component that goes beyond mere income effects.   
In recent years, there is a growing number of empirical studies that explore the relationship 
between farmers‘ preferences for risk and time and how they affect household decision 
making, which we classify into two broad categories. Researchers in the past have used 
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various techniques to measure risk and time preferences, including (i) the use of actual 
production data  (e.g., Antle, 1983, 1987; Di Falco, Chavas, & Smale, 2007; Di Falco & 
Chavas, 2009; Just & Pope, 1979) and (ii) experimental approaches that include examples 
that are hypothetical (e.g Binswanger, 1980; Brick, Visser, & Burns, 2012; Holt & Laury, 
2002) or that involve real pay-offs (Mosley & Verschoor, 2005; Tanaka, Camerer, & 
Nguyen, 2010; Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009). Despite the growing number of elicitation 
methods, there are only very few studies comparing different risk elicitation methods. This 
is particularly important since previous investigations have shown that results on risk 
attitudes are often affected by the method used. This may also have implications for policy 
recommendations.  
1.5 Research objectives and outline 
The broad objectives of this dissertation are to analyze the welfare impacts of sustainability 
standards and experimentally compare two risk elicitation methods using data from 
smallholder farmers in Uganda. The specific research objectives that will be addressed in 
three manuscripts of this dissertation are as follows:  
1. To analyze and compare impacts of three sustainability oriented certification 
schemes – namely, Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic – on household living standards 
and poverty.  
2. To analyze the impact of sustainability oriented certification on household 
undernutrition and dietary quality and identify the main nutrition impact pathways. 
3. To compare the performance of two experimental methods in eliciting risk attitudes 
and how well they are understood by farmers.  
The analyses of these objectives rely on two datasets. To analyze objective 1 and 2, we use 
a comprehensive household survey data collected in Uganda from 419 coffee farmers. The 
household questionnaire used is attached in the Appendix at the end of the dissertation. To 
analyze objective 3, we will use data collected from a framed field experiment that elicited 
risk preferences from 332 farmers, which is a sub-sample of the 419 farmers from the 
household survey. The instructions used to conduct the experiment are also contained in 
the Appendix at the end of the dissertation. The rest of the dissertation is organized as 
follows: Chapter II presents the first manuscript titled “Food Standards, Certification, and 
Poverty among Coffee Farmers in Uganda”, employs propensity score matching (PSM) 
techniques to estimate the differential impacts of Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic standards on 
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the living standard and poverty of coffee farmers. Chapter III presents the second 
manuscript titled ―Sustainability Standards, Gender, and Nutrition among Coffee Farmers 
in Uganda”. This study applies an instrumental variable approach to estimate the nutrition 
impacts and impact pathways of sustainability standards among coffee farmers in Uganda. 
Chapter IV presents the third manuscript titled ―Do Changing Probabilities or Payoffs in 
Lottery-Choice Experiments Affect the Results? Evidence from Rural Uganda”. It uses 
experimental methods to compare different risk elicitation methods regarding the 
consistency of risk attitude measures as well as inconsistency rates on the response 
behavior. Chapter V summarizes the main findings and concludes with some policy 
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Private standards are gaining in importance in global markets for high-value foods. We 
analyze and compare impacts of three sustainability oriented standards – Fairtrade, 
Organic, and UTZ – on the livelihoods of smallholder coffee farmers in Uganda. Using 
survey data and propensity score matching with multiple treatments, we find that Fairtrade 
certification increases household living standards by 30% and significantly reduces the 
prevalence and depth of poverty. For the other two certification schemes, no significant 
impacts are found. Institutional factors that may explain differential impacts are discussed. 
Overly general statements about the effects of standards on smallholder livelihoods may be 
misleading.  
Key words 
Coffee, smallholder farmers, Organic, Fairtrade, impact, Uganda, Africa. 
JEL classification  
I32, L15, O12, Q13, Q17. 
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This chapter was published in the GlobalFood Discussion Paper Series No. 27 (2013). The co-authors of 
this article are Matin Qaim and David Spielman. 
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1 Introduction  
Food systems around the world are undergoing a rapid transformation, with modern 
retailers, private standards, and vertically integrated supply chains gaining in importance 
(Henson, Masakure, & Boselie, 2005; Reardon, Barrett, Berdegué, & Swinnen, 2009). This 
transformation is partly driven by changing consumer preferences, induced by rising living 
standards and growing concerns about food safety and the environmental and social 
consequences of agricultural production (Mergenthaler, Weinberger, & Qaim, 2009; 
Narrod et al., 2009). What do these trends imply for smallholder farmers in developing 
countries? On the one hand, farmers may profit from higher prices that are paid for high-
quality products. They may also benefit from technical and institutional support that is 
sometimes provided in integrated supply chains. On the other hand, smallholders may find 
it difficult to meet the high standards, or they might be exploited by agribusiness 
companies through monopsony situations or unfavorable contracts. 
A growing body of literature has studied related questions in different developing 
countries. One literature strand has analyzed the impacts of new supermarket procurement 
channels on smallholder productivity and household welfare (e.g., Hernandez, Reardon, & 
Berdegué, 2007; Neven, Odera, Reardon, & Wang, 2009; Rao & Qaim, 2011; Rao, 
Brümmer, & Qaim, 2012). Another literature strand has studied the direct and indirect 
effects of GlobalGAP and other private standards in horticultural export channels on small-
scale producers (e.g., Maertens & Swinnen, 2009; Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2010; 
Carletto, Kirk, Winters, & Davis, 2010; Colen, Maertens, & Swinnen, 2012). Most of these 
studies show that poor rural households can benefit from modern supply chains through 
own participation as producers or through labor markets. 
However, the number of standards is growing, and different standards may have different 
impacts. Hence, overly general statements about the welfare effects of standards for 
smallholder farmers may not be justified. Especially for luxury foods – such as coffee, tea, 
or cocoa – retailers and manufacturers are increasingly using sustainability oriented 
standards and labels to differentiate their products and fulfill objectives of corporate social 
responsibility. This trend is supported by non-governmental organizations and independent 
certification bodies (Liu, Byers, Giovannucci et al., 2008). For coffee, the global market 
share of products with sustainability certification – such as Organic, Fairtrade, UTZ, or 
Rainforest Alliance – has doubled from 4% in 2006 to 8% in 2009; it is expected to grow 
to over 20% in the next couple of years (ITC, 2011). Especially in rich and emerging 
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countries, a rising share of consumers is willing to pay more for foods that are labeled to be 
sustainably produced. For coffee and other tropical products, this also involves consumer 
perceptions to contribute to improved livelihoods of smallholder farmers (Basu & Hicks, 
2008; Elfenbein & McManus, 2010). However, actual evidence about producer benefits is 
mixed (ITC, 2011). 
Several studies have explored the impacts of different sustainability standards on coffee 
producers in developing countries. Impacts of Fairtrade, Organic, and other certification 
schemes were analyzed in Nicaragua (Utting-Chamorro, 2005; Bacon, 2005; Valkila & 
Nygren, 2009; Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011), Mexico (Jaffee, 2008; Barham, Callenes, Gitter, 
Lewis, & Weber, 2011), and other countries in Latin America (Raynolds, Murray, & 
Taylor, 2004). Some of these studies are qualitative in nature. Others used quantitative 
techniques but without accounting for non-random selection of farmers into certification 
schemes, so the impact estimates may be biased. There are also a few quantitative studies 
that tried to control for selection bias, but most of these studies focused on only one 
certification scheme. Arnould, Plastina, & Ball (2009) evaluated the impact of Fairtrade 
certification on coffee farmers in Peru, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, using a multi-stage 
sampling procedure. Ruben & Fort (2012) also focused on Fairtrade, evaluating impacts in 
Peru with propensity score matching techniques. Bolwig, Gibbon & Jones (2009) analyzed 
impacts of Organic certification in Uganda, and Wollni & Zeller (2007) looked at specialty 
coffees in Costa Rica; both studies used Heckman selection models. Jena et al. (2012) 
evaluated the impact of coffee certification on smallholder farmers in Ethiopia; their 
sample included Fairtrade and Organic farmers, but the results were not disaggregated by 
certification scheme. We are not aware of studies that compared impacts of different 
certification schemes in the same context, using quantitative techniques and controlling for 
selection bias. Such comparison could help to better understand how differences in the 
institutional design of standards and certification schemes affect smallholder livelihoods. 
Here, we address this research gap by analyzing and comparing impacts of three 
sustainability oriented certification schemes – namely, Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic – on 
household living standards and poverty among smallholder coffee producers in Uganda. 
We use household survey data collected in 2012 and employ a propensity score matching 
approach with multiple treatments to control for observed heterogeneity between different 
groups of farmers. We also test for the potential role of unobserved heterogeneity. The 
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estimation results suggest that there are indeed significant differences in impacts between 
certification schemes. 
2 Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic standards 
Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic are among the most important sustainability oriented 
standards in the global coffee market. Recent trends in the global trade of coffee under 
these standards are shown in Figure 1. All three are relevant for smallholder farmers in 
developing countries, and all three have social and environmental objectives. For 
smallholders to be certified under any of these standards, they need to be organized in 
farmer groups or cooperatives. 
 
Figure 1: Global import quantities of Organic, Fairtrade, and UTZ Certified coffee 
Source: Own graphical presentation based on data from ITC (2011). 
Fairtrade certification and labeling systems for coffee were launched in 1988 by the 
Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO) with the aim of improving the livelihoods of 
smallholder producers and cushioning them from volatile market prices. Fairtrade 
certification can only be attained by smallholder producer organizations that are farmer 
managed, transparent, and founded on democratic principles. Democratic principles require 
that leaders are elected by all members of the organization. The Fairtrade label guarantees 
producers a minimum floor price, whenever the international free market price falls below 
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a certain threshold. In addition, a Fairtrade premium is paid to the producer organization to 
be used for capacity building, community development, and related projects. Producers 
have to ensure good labor conditions for workers, including payment of minimum wages, 
no child labor, and measures to reduce occupational health hazards. There are also specific 
rules for environmental protection, including practices for sustainability soil and water 
management and safe use of pesticides and fertilizers (Fairtrade, 2011). The most 
important markets for Fairtrade coffee are the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands (ITC, 2011). 
The UTZ labeling system (formerly known as UTZ Kapeh) is a more recently founded 
standard. It was established in 1999 by the Ahold Coffee Company, a Dutch roaster, but is 
now used by other European coffee companies and restaurant chains as well. The primary 
focus of UTZ is on traceability and sustainability production processes, based on Good 
Agricultural Practice (GAP) as specified by GlobalGAP. The GlobalGAP standard requires 
producers to comply with the labor laws concerning wages and working hours, and to 
handle agrochemicals responsibly, as stipulated by the International Labor Organization. 
The UTZ label does not guarantee a minimum price to producers, nor does it provide any 
premium or protection against price volatility. It is mandatory for UTZ certified farmers to 
be trained in GAP. The idea is that this training will contribute to higher coffee yields, 
better quality, and thus higher prices. The official website says: ―Through the UTZ-
program farmers grow better crops, generate more income and create better opportunities 
while safeguarding the environment and securing the earth‘s natural resources‖ (UTZ 
Certified, 2013). Blackmore et al. (2012) argue that the certification process is less 
bureaucratic for UTZ than for other sustainability oriented standards, which may be one 
reason for the rapid expansion of this standard. The Netherlands is the biggest consumer of 
UTZ certified coffee; around 30% of all coffee consumed in the Netherlands has the UTZ 
label (ITC, 2011).  
The Organic standard follows the principles of health, ecology, fairness, and care. Certified 
farmers have to use production methods based on traditional and scientific knowledge that 
maximize farm soil fertility and enhance biodiversity. The use of inorganic inputs such as 
synthetic fertilizers and chemical pesticides is strictly prohibited. Organic certification 
requires farmers to strictly follow organic production guidelines for a minimum period of 
three years (referred to as the conversion period) before getting full certification, thus 
making it one of the most stringent among the voluntary standards (Coulibaly & Liu, 
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2006). Prices paid for Organic coffee are usually higher than for uncertified coffee. The 
international guidelines for Organic farming are set by the International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), an organization based in Germany with 
affiliated organizations in over 100 countries. In addition, some countries and companies 
use their own organic standards, which are similar to the IFOAM guidelines but may differ 
in certain details. 
A fundamental difference between the three standards is that Fairtrade and Organic provide 
price bonuses in comparison to free market prices, while UTZ does not. Fairtrade provides 
a minimum guaranteed price that is above the average cost of production and independent 
of the prevailing international price, while the Organic price is usually above the prevailing 
international price, but not necessarily above the average cost of production. Hence, the 
social sustainability component has a higher weight in Fairtrade than in the other two 
standards. 
3 Methods 
3.1 Modeling farmers’ choice of certification scheme 
We model farmers‘ participation in a particular certification scheme in a random utility 
framework. Utility, 𝑈, is determined by a set of socioeconomic variables and contextual 
factors, X, which also influence the farmers‘ ability and willingness to participate in 
certification. The farmer is assumed to maximize utility 
 MAX 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑋). (1)  
We postulate that coffee farmer 𝑖 will participate in a certified coffee market j if and only if 
the utility 𝑈𝑖𝑗  derived is greater than the utility 𝑈𝑖𝑚  that results from accessing an 
alternative market m. This relationship can be represented by latent variable 𝐼∗ as 
 𝐼∗ =  𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑚        ∀𝑚 ≠ 𝑗 (2)  
wher𝑒 𝐼∗ is representing the benefits of participating in certified coffee market j as 
opposed to market m. While 𝐼∗ itself is unobserved, we can observe the type of marketing 
channel the farmer participates in. The probability that a farmer participates in certified 
market j can be denoted by Pr(𝐼 =1); if the farmer does not participate in market j, 𝐼∗ takes 
a value of zero. The utility maximizing behavior of farmers can be represented as 
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𝑈𝑖 =  
𝐼∗     𝑖𝑓  𝐼𝑖𝑗  ≥ 0
0     𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖𝑚  < 0
         ∀𝑚 ≠ 𝑗   
(3)  
If we assume a linear relationship, I* can be written as 
 𝐼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑗  (4)  
where β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and u is a vector of random disturbances 
of the unobserved factors affecting the participation decision. 
3.2 Modeling the impact of certification  
In theory, impacts of a program should be evaluated by estimating the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) as follows  
 𝐸 𝑊𝑖   𝐼 = 1) =  𝐸(𝑌𝑖1 𝐼 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0 𝐼 = 1), (5)  
where 𝑊𝑖  denotes the unbiased welfare effect for households i that participate in the 
program, I =1. In our case, I = 1 means that households participate in a particular 
certification scheme. 𝑌𝑖1 is the outcome variable of interest (e.g., income, poverty) with 
certification, while 𝑌𝑖0 is the outcome variable when the same households were not 
certified. Unfortunately, the same households are not observed with and without 
certification, so in reality one has to compare certified and uncertified households that are 
not identical as follows 
 𝐸 𝑊𝑖   𝐼 = 1)  =  𝐸(𝑌𝑖1 𝐼 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0 𝐼 = 0), (6)  
where 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0 𝐼 = 0) is the outcome for households not participating in certification. 
Equations (5) and (6) lead to identical results when there is no systematic difference 
between participating and non-participating households, except for the certification scheme 
itself. Yet, whenever participating and non-participating households differ in terms of 
observed or unobserved characteristics, equation (6) will lead to biased impact estimates, 
where the bias B can be represented as  
 𝐵 =  𝐸(𝑌𝑖0 𝐼 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0 𝐼 = 0). (7)  
A good method to avoid estimation bias is an experiment where households are randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups, thus ensuring that there are no systematic 
differences. In our case, such random assignment was not possible. Our study builds on 
observational data, where households self-selected into certification. We use a propensity 
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score matching approach to reduce selection bias B when evaluating the impact of different 
certification schemes. 
3.3 Propensity score matching with multiple treatments   
We use generalized propensity scores to control for pre-treatment differences between 
certified and uncertified households in estimating the ATT. Propensity score matching 
(PSM) is often used to evaluate impacts of a binary treatment variable (e.g., Fischer & 
Qaim, 2012; Ruben & Fort, 2012). However, in our case there are different certification 
schemes j that farmers can participate in, so that the treatment variable can take more than 
two values. In particular, with three certification schemes and one control group, the 
treatment variable can have four possible values. We define j=0 for farm households that 
are not certified under any scheme, j=1 for households with Fairtrade certification, j=2 for 
households with UTZ certification, and j=3 for households with Organic certification. We 
follow theoretical foundations by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) and empirical 
applications by Gerfin & Lechner (2002) and Lechner (2002) for estimating propensity 
scores with multiple treatments. For each marketing channel, we predict the individual 
probability of participation using an unconditional multinomial probit model. Predicted 
propensity scores of participation can be written as 
 𝑃 𝑗  𝑥 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 =  0,1, . .3 . (8)  
Following Lechner (2002), the resulting pairwise propensity scores are 
 𝑃 𝑗│𝑚𝑗  𝑥 =
𝑃 𝑗 (𝑥)
𝑃 𝑗  𝑥 +𝑃 𝑚 (𝑥)
        ∀𝑚 ≠ 𝑗;          𝑗,𝑚 ∈ 𝐽 =  0,1, . .3 , (9)  
where 𝑃 𝑗│𝑚𝑗  𝑥  is the predicted conditional propensity score of a household participating 
in channel j as opposed to an alternative channel m. We want to evaluate the impact of 
certification in comparison to no certification. In addition, we are interested in how each 
certification scheme compares to no certification, and how the different schemes compare 
against each other. Thus, there are seven pairwise comparisons, namely certified vs. non-
certified, Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic vs. non-certified, as well as Fairtrade vs. UTZ, 
Fairtrade vs. Organic, and UTZ vs. Organic.  
Following Lechner (2001, 2002), estimation of ATT with multiple treatments can be 
extended to 
 ATT𝑗  𝑚
 
=  𝐸 𝑌𝑗 − 𝑌𝑚   𝐽 = 𝑗 , ∀𝑚 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 =  0,1, . .3    (10)  
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In our case ATT𝑗  𝑚
 
 estimates the expected average effects of participating in marketing 
channel j compared to the alternative channel m. 
As in any PSM analysis, an algorithm to match treated and control households has to be 
chosen. We use nearest neighbor matching (NNM) and kernel matching (KM), two 
commonly used algorithms for empirical analysis (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). NNM 
involves choosing a partner from the control group for matching with each treated 
household or individual based on propensity scores. We match each treated household with 
the three nearest neighbors (with replacement) in terms of propensity score distances. To 
avoid the possibility of bad matches, we impose a maximum caliper restriction of 0.1. KM 
uses non-parametric techniques to compare treated and control households based on 
kernel-weighted averages (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). For the KM, we specified a 
default bandwidth of 0.06. 
It should be stressed that PSM builds on the conditional independence assumption (CIA), 
which is also called selection on observables (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). This means that 
the method only controls for observed heterogeneity between treated and control 
households. Estimates of the ATT may still be biased when there is unobserved 
heterogeneity. We test for the influence of such hidden bias by calculating Rosenbaum 
bounds (DiPrete & Gangl, 2004; Becker & Caliendo, 2007). 
3.4 Estimating poverty outcomes  
We are interested in analyzing how sustainability certification affects the living standard 
and poverty of coffee-producing households in Uganda. We use household per capita 
expenditure on food and non-food consumption items as our measure of living standard. 
This also includes the market value of home-produced goods. In evaluating poverty 
outcomes, we make use of the FGT (Foster, Greer, & Thorbecke 1984) class of poverty 
measures, which are calculated as 
 













where N is the total number of households in the sample, z is the poverty line, 𝑞𝑖  is per 
capita expenditure of household i; q is the number of households below the poverty line, 
and α is the poverty aversion parameter. We calculate two measures, (i) the head count 
index, when α= 0, and (ii) the poverty gap index, when 𝛼 = 1. For the calculations, we use 
the international poverty line of $1.25 a day in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). 
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Expenditures by households in Ugandan shillings (UGX) are converted to international 
dollars by using the PPP exchange rate (World Bank, 2013).
2
 
4 Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Coffee production in Uganda  
Uganda is one of the top coffee producers in Africa, accounting for approximately 2.5% of 
global coffee production. Coffee is also the most important export crop in Uganda. Eighty-
five percent of the coffee grown in the country is Robusta, which is indigenous to Uganda, 
while the rest is Arabica (World Bank, 2011). It is estimated that in Uganda the coffee 
sector employs more than 3.5 million people directly and indirectly. The crop is mostly 
grown by smallholders; an estimated 90% of the coffee in Uganda is produced by farm 
households with less than 7 acres of total land (GAIN, 2012). In smallholder production 
systems, coffee is often intercropped with staples like banana, maize, and cassava; coffee is 
the main source of cash income, while the other crops are predominantly grown for 
subsistence consumption. 
Prior to 1991, the Ugandan coffee market was centrally controlled by a marketing board. 
Coffee producers were organized in cooperatives, and through these cooperatives the 
marketing board paid farmers a fixed price upon delivery, and a premium based on quality 
at a later stage. The fixed prices were often below world market levels, and the quality 
premium was often paid with significant delays. The system was liberalized in 1991. The 
Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) was established to monitor and regulate 
the market, and to promote value addition and competitiveness among local farmers. But 
the UCDA is not directly involved in purchasing or marketing coffee; this is left to 
independent private traders and companies. As a result of liberalization, market efficiency 
and prices that farmers received for their coffee increased, while poverty rates in coffee-
growing regions decreased (Baffes, 2006).  
Farmers in Uganda sell their coffee in different forms, depending on technical ability, 
availability of labor, financial needs, and other factors. When farmers urgently need cash 
already before the harvest, they sometimes decide to sell their coffee to middlemen when it 
is still at the flowering stage in the field. Prices received by farmers for such coffee sales 
are very low. Alternatively, when the coffee turns red, it can be harvested and sold as fresh 
                                                 
2 
The PPP exchange rate is 744.62 UGX per dollar. In 2012, the official market exchange rate was around 
2600 UGX per dollar. 
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red cherries. If the cherries are dried in the sun to a moisture content of about 12%, they 
can be sold as ‗kiboko‘. The sun-dried cherries can also be milled, by separating the husk 
from the bean, using a hulling machine. After milling, the coffee is sold as green beans. 
Green beans are then further graded by size, shape, and quality and exported to various 
international destinations for roasting (Fafchamps & Hill, 2005). 
4.2 Household survey  
We carried out a structured survey of coffee-producing households in Uganda between 
July and September 2012. For the selection of households to be interviewed, we used a 
multi-stage sampling procedure. At first, we contacted the main coffee associations in 
Uganda to obtain lists of existing farmer cooperatives, including information on their 
location, the number of cooperative members, and certification details. Based on these lists 
and visits to many of the locations, we purposively selected three cooperatives. These three 
cooperatives had similar agro-ecological and infrastructure conditions. All three are 
located in the Central Region of Uganda; two of them in Luwero District, and the third in 
Masaka District. In all three cooperatives, farmers produce Robusta coffee. Luwero and 
Masaka are among the top four districts that account for over 50% of Uganda‘s Robusta 
coffee production. 
All three cooperatives selected had acquired UTZ certification around the year 2007; two 
of them had added a second certification scheme shortly thereafter. At the time of the 
survey, one cooperative had only UTZ, the second had UTZ plus Fairtrade, and the third 
UTZ plus Organic certification. We could not identify farmers that are only certified under 
Fairtrade or Organic without also having UTZ certification. This may be considered a 
drawback for the evaluation of individual standards. However, we evaluate the impact of 
each standard not only in comparison to uncertified farmers but also in comparison to 
farmers with other standards, so the combination in two of the cooperatives is not a 
problem. As Fairtrade and Organic standards both have stronger requirements than the 
UTZ, we refer to the UTZ-Fairtrade combination as ―Fairtrade‖ and to the UTZ-Organic 
combination as ―Organic‖ below. 
Farmers have to be member of a cooperative to participate in the certification schemes, but 
not all members of the three cooperatives actually participated in certification. Hence, 
participation is an individual decision. Cooperative management provided us with lists of 
all members, including details on the location of each farm household and their 
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participation in certification schemes. In each cooperative we randomly selected two 
parishes, and in each parish we randomly selected three villages. In these villages, we 
randomly selected households for the interviews. In total, we interviewed 108 Fairtrade 
farmers, 101 Organic farmers, and 62 UTZ farmers. In addition, 148 control farmers were 
randomly selected from the lists of non-certified farmers in the same villages. 
The farmers were interviewed with a structured questionnaire by a small team of local 
enumerators that were carefully selected, trained, and supervised by the researchers. The 
questionnaire covered all economic activities of households with a detailed breakdown for 
coffee production and marketing. We also captured the household demographic 
composition, food and non-food consumption, and a variety of household contextual 
characteristics. Food consumption data were collected through a 7-day recall. As the 
timing of the survey was shortly after the main harvest, consumption levels may be 
somewhat higher than during other times of the year. Yet, as all farmers were surveyed 
during a relatively short period, this should not lead to any bias in the impact assessment. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of sample farmers with a disaggregation by 
certification scheme. There are a few significant differences between certified and non-
certified farmers. Certified farms have larger households, older household heads, longer 
experience with coffee cultivation, and better access to credit and agricultural extension. 
They also have larger farms and shorter distances to all-weather roads and input shops. 
Furthermore, we observe a few significant differences between farmers in different 
certification schemes. On average, Fairtrade farmers are better educated, own larger 
houses, and have better access to credit than UTZ and Organic farmers. They are also more 
likely to have a leadership position in the cooperative or any other local association, which 
we use as a proxy for diplomatic skills and social standing. On the other hand, UTZ 
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Table 1: Summary statistics by certification scheme 
 












Household characteristics      
Male household head (dummy) 0.791 0.738 0.806 0.694 0.693 
 (0.41) (0.44) (0.40) (0.46) (0.46) 









 (15.44) (12.82) (11.96) (13.05) (13.60) 







 (3.33) (3.78) (3.66) (3.57) (3.63) 





 (0.43) (0.42) (0.29) (0.43) (0.48) 







 (3.07) (3.23) (2.55) (2.95) (3.94) 









 (1.78) (2.19) (1.80) (1.82) (2.70) 









 (1.48) (1.51) (1.53) (1.25) (1.33) 







 (32.79) (17.33) (16.15) (17.88) (17.59) 









 (12.75) (15.59) (15.33) (16.50) (15.40) 







 (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.48) 









 (0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) 









 (0.39) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.44) 







 (0.46) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
Farm characteristics      









 (3.30) (4.70) (3.37) (3.53) (6.20) 









 (47.70) (71.65) (24.75) (22.64) (23.52) 
Distance to input market (km) 5.712 4.009
**
 4.484 3.677 3.705
*
 
 (8.32) (3.87) (4.74) (3.21) (3.10) 





 (6.19) (3.02) (3.10) (2.46) (3.19) 









 (15.40) (8.31) (6.71) (3.31) (6.01) 
Living standard and poverty      







 (1,582) (1,821) (1,902) (1,666) (1,743) 





 (0.44) (0.41) (0.35) (0.44) (0.43) 
Notes: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. Mean values across schemes are tested for 
statistically significant differences; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 when compared to non-certified farmers; a p<0.1, b 
p<0.05, c p<0.01 for differences between Fairtrade and UTZ; d p<0.1, e p<0.05, f p<0.01 for differences between UTZ and 
Organic; g p<0.1, h p<0.05,i p<0.01 for differences between Organic and Fairtrade. # Worker equivalents were calculated 
by weighting household members; less than 9 years = 0; 9 to 15 years or above 49 years = 0.7; 16 to 49 = 1. 
Considering household consumption expenditures and poverty levels, which are shown in 
the lower part of Table 1, Fairtrade farmers seem to be better off than all other groups. This 
is also visualized in Figure 2, which depicts cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of 
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per capita expenditure for certified and non-certified farmers in our sample. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the Fairtrade distribution stochastically dominates 
the CDF of uncertified farmers (p<0.01) and that of UTZ farmers (p<0.05). The pooled 
CDF for certified farmers dominates that of non-certified farmers at 10% significance 
level. Figure 3 shows the poverty headcount index and the poverty gap. Fairtrade farmers 
are less likely to be poor, and those below the poverty line are less likely to be very poor. 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of per capita expenditure by certification scheme 
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Figure 3: Poverty indicators by certification scheme 
These descriptive statistics suggest that there are systematic differences between 
participants and non-participants in certified markets and also between participants in 
different certification schemes. However, without estimating treatment effects we do not 
know whether the observed differences in household living standards are impacts of 
certification or the result of other factors. This will be analyzed in the next section. 
5 Estimation results and discussion  
5.1 Factors influencing the certification decision  
We start this analysis by analyzing the factors that influence household decisions to 
participate in a particular certification scheme. We estimate a multinomial probit model for 
the three certification schemes and take non-certified farmers as the base category. As 
described above, this multinomial probit is also employed to calculate propensity scores. 
Hence, we include a broad range of explanatory variables. Estimation results are shown in 
Table 2. For the calculation of propensity scores it does not matter if the explanatory 
variables are endogenous. However, to the extent possible we tried to use exogenous 
variables. For the more durable assets such as size of the house and landholding we 
preferred values lagged by five years, as this was the time when the certification schemes 
started in the study region. Thus, we avoid possible reverse causality. Interestingly, lagged 
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size of the landholding does not influence participation in any of the three schemes, 
suggesting that certification is scale-neutral in this local context. However, the size of the 
house, which we use as a proxy of wealth, increases the likelihood of Fairtrade and UTZ 
certification. 
Table 2: Multinomial probit estimates for participation in certification schemes 
Variables  Fairtrade UTZ Organic 
Household characteristics    
Male household head (dummy) -0.142 0.158 0.893 
 (0.384) (0.501) (0.634) 
Age of household head (years) 0.104 0.127 0.270
**
 
 (0.077) (0.093) (0.115) 





 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education of household head (years) 0.067 0.073 -0.036 
 (0.050) (0.071) (0.083) 
Cellphone ownership (dummy) 0.106 0.334 0.284 
 (0.467) (0.475) (0.586) 
Labor capacity (worker equivalents) 0.061 0.172 0.243
*
 
 (0.087) (0.119) (0.135) 





 (0.100) (0.132) (0.211) 
Years resident in community 0.006 0.008 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) 
Years growing coffee 0.038
***
 0.017 0.029 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.024) 
Leadership position (dummy) 0.853
***
 0.554 -0.695 
 (0.326) (0.466) (0.653) 





 (0.312) (0.484) (0.584) 
Access to savings account (dummy) 0.200 0.312 0.536 
 (0.364) (0.558) (0.666) 
Access to credit (dummy) 0.985
***
 0.631 0.854 
 (0.303) (0.443) (0.523) 
Farm characteristics    
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) -0.017 -0.089 0.059 
 (0.042) (0.069) (0.071) 







 (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) 
Distance to input market (km) -0.030 0.038 -0.069 
 (0.027) (0.071) (0.071) 
Distance to output market (km) 0.039 0.076 0.092
*
 
 (0.037) (0.088) (0.053) 















 (5.239) (9.834) (10.94) 
Log likelihood -178.7   
Chi-square 200.0
***
   
Observations 419   
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses. The base category consists of farmers without 
any certification. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Farmers with local leadership positions are more likely to be Fairtrade certified, while 
access to extension seems to be more important for UTZ and Organic certification. Organic 
production involves knowledge-intensive agronomic practices, so farmers with access to 
extension may find it easier to participate. Organic practices are often more labor-
intensive, too. Hence, households with a larger family labor capacity have an advantage. 
And, in organic production external inputs such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides are 
replaced with household resources, which may explain why farms further away from roads 
and markets are more likely to be certified in the Organic scheme. For them, it is more 
difficult to access such external inputs anyway. In contrast, better road access increases the 
likelihood of participation in Fairtrade and UTZ certification. 
Based on this multinomial probit model, we predict propensity scores for the PSM 
analysis. Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix show the propensity score distributions for 
each of the seven pairwise comparisons. Regions of common support are identified by 
eliminating observations in the treatment and control groups that do not find matches due 
to too low or too high propensity scores (―untreated off-support‖ and ―treated off-
support‖). These eliminated observations are not included in the calculation of the 
treatment effects below. 
5.2 Impact of certification  
Table 3 shows the average treatment effects of certification on household expenditure and 
poverty levels for the different matching comparisons. On average, the ATTs are 
somewhat larger with nearest neighbor matching than with kernel matching, although the 
significance levels are almost identical. Looking at the first comparison between certified 
and non-certified farmers, we find that certification increases consumption expenditure by 
UGX 369-479 per capita and day (PPP $ 0.50-0.64). This effect is significant and implies 
an increase in living standard by 12-15% when compared to mean expenditure levels of 
non-certified households. However, the effects on household poverty are not statistically 
significant. These results are similar to the findings of Jena et al. (2012) in Ethiopia; they 
also concluded that certification somewhat increased household expenditures among 
smallholder coffee producers, but without a significant effect on poverty. 
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Table 3: Average treatment effects on the treated for household expenditure and poverty 
 Nearest neighbor matching Kernel matching  
 
ATT S.E. ATT S.E. Г 
Certified vs. non-certified      




 180.24 1.9 
   Poverty headcount index -0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.05 1.5 
   Poverty gap index 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 1.3 
Fairtrade vs. non-certified      




 229.69 1.6 




 0.05 2.0 




 0.04 1.5 
UTZ vs. non-certified      
   Per capita expenditure (UGX) -51.70 269.70 36.72 254.52 1.2 
   Poverty headcount index -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.07 1.3 
   Poverty gap index 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 1.1 
Organic vs. non-certified      
   Per capita expenditure (UGX) 242.42 286.99 0.55 252.84 1.3 
   Poverty headcount index -0.04 0.08 0.02 0.07 1.4 
   Poverty gap index 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 1.1 
Fairtrade vs. UTZ      




 286.93 1.8 
   Poverty headcount index -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07 1.4 




 0.06 2.3 
Fairtrade vs. Organic      
   Per capita expenditure (UGX) 619.75
*
 334.15 484.8 331.01 1.4 
   Poverty headcount index -0.08 0.08 -0.07 0.08 1.1 




 0.1 2.3 
UTZ vs. Organic      
   Per capita expenditure (UGX) 97.53 405.28 -106.55 343.34 1.2 
   Poverty headcount index 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.09 1.1 
   Poverty gap index -0.17 0.18 0.03 0.13 1.1 
Notes: ATT: average treatment effect on the treated; S.E.: bootstrapped standard errors; Г: Rosenbaum bounds (critical 
levels of hidden bias). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Disaggregating by certification scheme, we find that the positive impact on household 
expenditure is entirely driven by Fairtrade certification. Participation in Fairtrade increases 
per capita expenditure by 27-33%, while the effects for UTZ and Organic are both 
insignificant. Likewise, we find significant poverty-reducing effects for Fairtrade, but not 
for UTZ and Organic. Participation in Fairtrade reduces the poverty headcount index by 
0.13-0.15, implying a 50% reduction of the poverty rates among non-certified households. 
Fairtrade also reduces the poverty gap by 9-11 percentage points. These results confirm 
that differentiating impacts by certification scheme is important. 
How do the three certification schemes compare with each other in terms of living standard 
effects? Fairtrade farmers have significantly higher household expenditures than both UTZ 
and Organic farmers. The differences in the poverty headcount index between certification 
schemes are not statistically significant. Interestingly, however, Fairtrade farmers below 
the poverty line have a much lower poverty gap than their colleagues in the UTZ and 
Organic schemes. Comparing UTZ with Organic, none of the effects is statistically 
significant. These patterns underline that Fairtrade is more beneficial for smallholder 
coffee farmers in Uganda than the other two certification schemes. The results also suggest 
that the combination of treatments in two of the cooperatives is unlikely to confuse the 
impact assessment. As discussed above, Fairtrade farmers actually have UTZ plus 
Fairtrade certification, whereas Organic farmers have UTZ plus Organic certification. Our 
estimates show that participation in UTZ alone has no significant effect on living standard. 
Hence, it seems justified to attribute the combined UTZ-Fairtrade effects primarily to the 
Fairtrade standard. This does not rule out that UTZ certification may facilitate participation 
in more stringent standards, such as Fairtrade or Organic. 
5.3 Robustness tests 
As discussed in section 3, PSM controls for selection bias in impact assessment that is 
caused by observed heterogeneity between treatment and control groups. While we have 
used a broad set of farm, household, and contextual variables to calculate the propensity 
scores, it is still possible that there are unobserved factors that could be jointly correlated 
with the decision to participate in certification and household living standard. Such 
unobserved heterogeneity could bias the estimated treatment effects. To test the robustness 
of our results we calculate Rosenbaum bounds for hidden bias (DiPrete & Gangl, 2004; 
Becker & Caliendo, 2007). Assume two matched individuals with the same observed 
covariates that differ in their odds of participating in a certification scheme solely by the 
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difference in unobserved factors. The Rosenbaum bound (Г) measures how big the 
difference in unobserved factors that drive the participation decision would have to be, in 
order to render the estimated ATT insignificant. 
The Rosenbaum bounds are shown in the last column of Table 3.
3
 For the significant 
ATTs, the values for Г range between 1.5 and 2.3. The lower bound of 1.5 (for the 
Fairtrade poverty gap effect) implies that matched farmers with the same observed 
covariates would have to differ in terms of unobserved covariates by a factor of 1.5 (50%), 
in order to invalidate the inference of a significant treatment effect. The upper bound of 2.3 
implies that unobserved covariates could even differ by a factor of 2.3 (130%). Based on 
these results we conclude that the impact estimates are quite robust to possible hidden bias. 
5.4 Possible impact pathways 
We have shown that Fairtrade certification is associated with significant benefits for 
smallholder coffee producers in Uganda, while UTZ and Organic certification is not. What 
are the reasons for these differences in impact between certification schemes? Differences 
in prices that farmers receive for their coffee may play a role. In section 2, we discussed 
that the three standards involve different pricing schemes. Fairtrade provides minimum 
support prices to farmers plus a Fairtrade premium to the cooperative, while Organic 
coffee is supposed to fetch a bonus on top of international market prices. In Table 4, we 
show average coffee prices received by sample farmers in different marketing channels. As 
coffee prices can fluctuate considerably, we asked farmers to report prices received over a 
period of two years. These price data are not normally distributed; we show median prices 
that better reflect the average than arithmetic means. Prices received by farmers for 
certified coffee are significantly higher than for non-certified coffee. This is in line with 
expectations and with studies conducted in other settings (e.g., Bacon, 2005; Wollni & 
Zeller, 2007). However, further disaggregation by certification scheme reveals that this 
pattern is primarily driven by the high prices in the Fairtrade scheme. In fact, average 
prices received for UTZ and Organic coffee are not significantly different from prices 
received for non-certified coffee. This also confirms farmers‘ subjective perceptions. 
Especially Organic farmers in our sample pointed out that there is usually no difference in 
prices between certified Organic and uncertified channels. An advantage of selling to 
                                                 
3
 The Rosenbaum bounds shown in Table 3 refer to the nearest neighbor matching algorithm. We did the 
same calculations also for the kernel matching algorithm with almost identical results. 
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traders in uncertified channels is that farmers get cash on the spot, while sales in the 
Organic channels are through the cooperative and associated with payment delays. 
Table 4: Median prices received for coffee under different certification schemes 
Certification scheme Median coffee price
 
(UGX/kg) Interquartile range 













Notes: Median coffee prices received by farmers were calculated over the last two seasons. The interquartile range is 
analogous to the standard deviation for the median. Median prices between schemes are tested for statistically significant 
differences using the Kruskal-Wallis test; a p<0.01 when compared to non-certified; b p<0.01 when compared to 
Fairtrade; c p<0.01 when compared to UTZ; d p<0.01 when compared to Organic. 
Table 4 shows that the average price received for Fairtrade coffee is more than double the 
price of uncertified coffee. This is not only due to price bonuses for certified coffee, but 
also to differences in processing and sales channels. Many non-certified farmers sell their 
coffee as fresh red cherries or as ‗kiboko‘. UTZ and Organic producers also sell primarily 
in the ‗kiboko‘ stage. In contrast, farmers in the Fairtrade cooperative mostly sell their 
coffee after milling in the green bean stage. Hence, Fairtrade farmers benefit from value 
addition at the cooperative level. Such value addition, including capacity building and 
technological upgrading, is especially promoted through the Fairtrade premium. 
Obviously, other cooperatives could also engage in further processing, but this is not 
specifically supported in any of the other schemes. Furthermore, there is an important 
institutional difference in the local context. The Fairtrade cooperative is entirely managed 
by its farmer members, and it owns the certification documents itself. The cooperative 
independently sells the coffee directly to exporters in Kampala, where it can negotiate 
prices. In contrast, the certification process for the UTZ and Organic cooperatives was 
partly funded by local export companies. Thus, the certification documents are owned by 
these companies, who buy the coffee from certified farmers and determine prices and 
processing stages. 
6 Conclusions  
Global food systems are undergoing a rapid transformation, with high-value market 
segments, private standards, and certification schemes gaining in importance. Smallholder 
farmers in developing countries may potentially benefit from these trends when they can 
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be linked successfully to the emerging international value chains. Especially for luxury 
foods from tropical regions – such as coffee, tea, and cocoa – manufacturers and retailers 
use an increasing number of sustainability oriented standards and labels that also promise 
to improve the livelihoods of farmers. Several recent studies have analyzed the impacts of 
sustainability oriented standards on farmers in developing countries, but no previous 
research has compared the effects of different standards in the same setting with rigorous 
quantitative evaluation techniques. This can be important to better understand how 
differences in standard design and certification practices can affect outcomes at the local 
level. In this article, we have addressed this research gap and have analyzed and compared 
the impact of three standards, namely Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic, on the livelihoods of 
coffee farmers in Uganda. For the analysis, we have used data from a household survey in 
Central Uganda and a propensity score matching approach with multiple treatments. 
Estimation results show that farm households in all three certification schemes combined 
have significantly higher living standards than their matched counterparts in non-certified 
channels. Poverty effects are not statistically significant for the combined sample of 
certified households. However, disaggregation by certification scheme has revealed 
important differences. Fairtrade certification causes a 30% increase in per capita 
consumption expenditures, primarily through higher prices received in the Fairtrade 
channel. Fairtrade certification cuts the likelihood of being poor by 50% and also 
significantly reduces the poverty gap. Participation in UTZ and Organic certification 
schemes is not associated with significant impacts on living standards and poverty. In fact, 
average prices received by UTZ and Organic farmers are not different from those received 
by non-certified farmers. These results confirm that differentiating by certification scheme 
is important. Overly broad statements about the impact of certification in general may be 
misleading. 
The differences in impact can be explained by various factors. First, Fairtrade guarantees 
farmers a minimum support price and pays an additional Fairtrade premium to the 
cooperative for capacity building and related community projects. Such social premiums 
are not paid in UTZ and Organic certification schemes. Second, farmers in the Fairtrade 
cooperative have more freedom how to market their coffee. The cooperative owns the 
certification documents itself and can sell to any buyer; thus it is in a better position to 
negotiate prices. In contrast, the UTZ and Organic certification documents are owned by 
specific exporters, to which participating farmers have to sell their coffee. Third, and 
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related to the previous point, the Fairtrade cooperative sells most of the coffee from its 
members in milled form as green beans; member farmers benefit from this value addition 
at the cooperative level. UTZ and Organic farmers, on the other hand, sell most of their 
coffee in unprocessed form, as specified by the exporters that own the certification 
documents. Some of these factors are specific to the particular cooperatives analyzed here. 
Therefore, one should not extrapolate these findings to other settings without further 
analysis. We should also stress that our study is not an attempt to holistically assess all 
possible impacts of certification. We focused on socioeconomic implications for 
smallholder producers in terms of living standard and poverty. Especially the Organic 
standard places higher priority on aspects of environmental sustainability, which we did 
not analyze here. 
Nevertheless, there are some broader lessons that can be learned from our results. First, 
when provided with institutional support, smallholder farmers and cooperatives can 
participate in certified markets and comply with stringent food quality and food safety 
standards. The cooperatives investigated in this study, in one of the poorest countries in the 
world, were certified around the year 2007 and have since managed to fully comply with 
the different international standards. This is encouraging and disproves pessimistic views 
that smallholder farmer will not be able to participate in high-value markets on a sustained 
basis. Second, the impact of standards and certification on farmer livelihoods may differ 
significantly by certification scheme. Hence, it is worthwhile to take a closer look. Better 
understanding impact differences and factors that contribute to these differences may be 
relevant for all actors along the supply chain, including for consumers who may wish to 
make more informed purchase decisions. Such understanding may also help improve the 
design of standards and certification systems from a social perspective. Third, the impacts 
of standards and certification systems depend to a large extent on institutional factors at the 
local level, including cooperative performance and management capacity. Certification 
may be a prerequisite for entering international high-value chains, but this alone is not a 
sufficient condition for improved livelihoods and poverty reduction. 
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Figure A1: Propensity score distribution and common support for certified and non-
certified farmers 
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Figure A2: Propensity score distribution and common support for farmers in different 
certification schemes. 
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Sustainability standards are gaining in importance in global markets for high-value foods. 
While previous research has shown that participating farmers in developing countries may 
benefit through income gains, nutrition impacts have hardly been analysed. We use survey 
data from smallholder coffee farmers in Uganda – certified under Fairtrade, Organic, and 
UTZ – to analyse impacts on food security and dietary quality. Estimates of instrumental 
variable models and simultaneous equation systems show that certification increases 
calorie and micronutrient consumption, mainly through higher incomes and improved 
gender equity. In certified households, women have greater control of coffee production 
and monetary revenues from sales. 
 
Key words 
Private standards, smallholder farmers, nutrition impact, gender, Uganda.  
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Global food systems are undergoing a rapid transformation, with high-value market 
segments, private standards, and certification schemes gaining in importance (Berdegué et 
al., 2005; Reardon & Timmer, 2012). This transformation is partly driven by changing 
consumer preferences resulting from rising incomes, urbanization, and growing concerns 
for food safety and environmental and social consequences of agricultural production 
(Mergenthaler, Weinberger, & Qaim, 2009; Narrod et al., 2009). To address these 
concerns, various sustainability standards were introduced. In rich and emerging countries, 
market shares of products with sustainability labels are growing. Especially for high-value 
foods imported from developing countries – such as coffee, tea, cocoa, or tropical fruits – 
voluntary sustainability standards like Fairtrade, Organic, UTZ, or Rainforest Alliance are 
increasingly used for product differentiation (Henson & Humphrey, 2010; Holzapfel & 
Wollni, 2014). Many of these standards involve smallholder farmers. Hence, this trend 
towards ―sustainable consumption‖ in rich countries may contribute to poverty reduction 
and rural development in poor countries. 
There is a growing body of literature looking at the impact of sustainability standards on 
smallholder farmers in developing countries. Many of these studies have analysed the 
effects of participating in Fairtrade and Organic certification schemes for producers of 
coffee (Arnould, Plastina, & Ball, 2009; Bolwig, Gibbon, & Jones, 2009; Blackman & 
Naranjo, 2012; Jena et al., 2012; Ruben & Fort, 2012; Chiputwa, Spielman, & Qaim, 
2015), cocoa (Jones & Gibbon, 2011), and tropical fruits (Ruben, 2008; Kleemann, 
Abdulai, & Buss, 2014). Most of these studies have analysed impacts in terms of output 
price levels and farm profits, some have also looked at household income and poverty. 
While the concrete results differ, and the specific institutional context plays an important 
role, a general conclusion is that smallholder farmers can indeed raise their income levels 
through participation in sustainability certification. 
One question that has received much less attention in the existing literature is whether 
sustainability standards can also help to improve food security and nutrition among 
smallholder farmers. Undernutrition is still a widespread problem in many developing 
countries, and a large proportion of the undernourished people are smallholder farmers. 
Against this background, it is critical to better understand the linkages between agriculture 
and nutrition and to include nutrition dimensions into impact evaluation of agricultural 
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programs (Hoddinott, 2012; Haddad, 2013; IFPRI, 2014). So far, little is known about the 
nutrition impacts of the food system transformation in developing-country farm households 
(Gomez & Ricketts, 2013). Income gains resulting from participation in high-value 
markets may contribute to improved nutrition. However, there is also evidence that 
agricultural commercialization can change gender roles within the farm household, often 
resulting in a lower share of the income being controlled by women (von Braun and 
Kennedy, 1994; Njuki et al., 2011). Since women tend to spend more on food and 
healthcare than men (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003), this 
shift in income control towards male household members might possibly lead to negative 
effects for dietary quality and nutrition. 
We are aware of only one study that has looked into the effects of sustainability standards 
on food cosumption in farm households with a quantitative approach: using data from a 
small sample of farmers in Kenya, Becchetti & Costantino (2008) showed that Fairtrade 
certification is positively associated with food expenditures and dietary quality. Becchetti 
& Costantino (2008) used a relatively simple dietary quality index, and they did not 
analyze the causal chain behind the observed differences in diets between certified and 
non-certified households. Other studies looked at gender effects of standards, yet without 
linking these to dietary or nutrition outcomes (Utting-Chamorro, 2005; Lyon, Bezaury, & 
Mutersbaugh, 2010; Maertens & Swinnen, 2012). Some of the sustainability standards 
consider the promotion of gender equity as an important element (Lyon et al., 2010), which 
may have implications for income control and nutrition. 
We contribute to this literature by analysing the nutrition impacts and impact pathways of 
sustainability standards among smallholder farmers in Uganda, where undernutrition is a 
sizeable problem. In particular, we use data from a comprehensive survey of smallholder 
coffee growers. In addition to uncertified farmers as a control group, the sample contains 
farmers who are certified under three different sustainability standards, namely Fairtrade, 
Organic, and UTZ. We use detailed food recall data to analyse impacts on household 
calorie and micronutrient consumption. Instrumental variable models are employed to 
control for possible selection bias. We also develop and estimate simultaneous equation 
systems to better understand causal chains, with a particular emphasis on income and 
gender effects. 
. 
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2.1 Measuring nutrition 
To analyse nutrition impacts of sustainability standards, we first need to identify 
appropriate indicators of nutrition. The most precise indicators of nutritional status are 
clinical measures (e.g., blood samples) and anthropometric data (Masset et al., 2012, 
IFPRI, 2014). However, clinical and anthropometric measures are less suitable to assess 
patterns of food security and dietary quality, which is what we concentrate on here. To 
analyse dietary patterns, data from household food consumption recalls are frequently 
used, which can be converted to calorie and nutrient values using food composition tables 
(Ecker & Qaim, 2011; Fiedler et al., 2012). We follow this approach and use calorie 
consumption levels to assess food security. Furthermore, we use the consumption of 
important micronutrients to assess dietary quality. Micronutrient consumption is also a 
good proxy for dietary diversity, because fruits, vegetables, and animal products contain 
larger quantities of micronutrients than typical staple foods. We focus on iron, zinc, and 
vitamin A, because deficiencies in these micronutrients cause large public health problems 
in developing countries (Stein et al., 2008; IFPRI, 2014). 
Details of the household survey are provided further below. Here, we only describe how 
the food consumption data were collected and used to derive the nutrition indicators. We 
conducted a food recall, asking survey respondents to report quantities of all foods 
consumed by the household during the last 7 days from own production, purchases, or any 
other source. To increase the accuracy of the responses, the food recall was carried out 
with the person in the households responsible for food preparation. The survey 
questionnaire included a breakdown of over 100 different food items. The reported food 
quantities consumed were converted to edible portions. These edible portions were then 
converted to quantities of calories and micronutrients, using recent food composition tables 
for Uganda (Hotz et al., 2012). 
To enable comparison across households of different size and composition, consumption 
levels at the household level were divided by the number of adult equivalents (AE) living 
in each household. We define a food-secure household as one whose calorie consumption 
per AE is greater than or equal the minimum daily requirement of 2400 kcal for adult men. 
The recommended dietary threshold levels used for the three micronutrients are 18.27 
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mg/day/AE for iron, 15 mg/day/AE for zinc, and 625 μg RE/day/AE for vitamin A (FAO, 
WHO, & UNU, 2001). 
While using household food consumption data has advantages to assess food security and 
dietary quality, the approach also has a few limitations (Bouis, 1994; de Haen, Klasen, & 
Qaim, 2011; Fiedler et al., 2012). First, by using a single 7-day recall we cannot account 
for seasonal variation in food consumption. The timing of our survey was shortly after the 
main harvest season, so that consumption levels may be somewhat higher than during other 
times of the year. Second, we are not able to account for intra-household food distribution. 
Third, the 7-day recall data measure consumption levels, which are only a proxy for actual 
food and nutrient intakes. Food wasted in the household or portions given to guests or fed 
to pets cannot always be fully accounted for, which may result in overestimated 
consumption levels. However, while these issues reduce the accuracy of the dietary 
assessments, they are unlikely to bias the impact estimates systematically, because they 
apply equally to certified and non-certified households. 
 
2.2 Modelling nutrition impacts 
We want to evaluate the impact of farmer participation in sustainability-oriented 
certification schemes on household nutrition. For this purpose, we start with a reduced-
form model as follows: 
 𝑁𝑖 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀1,       (1) 
where, 𝑁𝑖  is the nutrition indicator. In different regressions, we use household consumption 
of calories and micronutrients per AE as indicators of food security and dietary quality, as 
explained above. 𝐶𝑖  is the certification treatment variable, which we define in two different 
ways: (i) We use a treatment dummy that takes a value of one for certified farm households 
and zero otherwise. (ii) We use a continuous treatment variable measuring the number of 
years that a farm households has been certified already (duration); for non-certified 
households this variable takes a value of zero. 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of farm, household, and 
contextual variables that may influence nutrition, such as asset ownership, characteristics 
of the household and the household head, and infrastructure conditions. 𝜀1 is a random 
error term.  
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To evaluate whether certification has an impact on household nutrition, we are particularly 
interested in the coefficient 𝛼1. A positive and significant coefficient would imply that 
certification contributes to improved nutrition and vice versa. However, one problem in 
estimating equation (1) is that 𝐶𝑖  is likely endogenous. We use a sample where farm 
household decided themselves whether or not to participate in a certification scheme. It is 
possible that this decision is systematically correlated with unobserved factors that also 
influence nutrition, in which case the estimated treatment effect would suffer from non-
random selection bias. We deal with this problem by using an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. The challenge is to identify a valid instrument that is correlated with the 
treatment variable but uncorrelated with the nutrition outcomes. 
Following Wollni & Zeller (2007), who analysed welfare effects of farmer participation in 
specialty markets for coffee in Costa Rica, we use altitude of the farm as an instrument for 
𝐶𝑖 . Altitude has an influence on coffee quality (Decazy et al., 2003; Avelino et al., 2005). 
Since coffee quality matters for exporters in certified markets, certification is correlated 
with farm altitude. On the other hand, altitude has no direct influence on household 
nutrition. One might expect that coffee quality may influence sales prices and incomes also 
in non-certified markets. However, altitude differences in our sample are relatively small; 
most farms are located within a range of 1100-1300 m above sea level. Coffee sales prices 
and household incomes of non-certified farms are not correlated with altitude, so that the 
conditions for a valid instrument are fulfilled. 
2.3 Modelling impact pathways 
This The reduced-form model in equation (1) is useful to analyse whether sustainability 
certification has an impact on household nutrition, but it cannot explain impact pathways. 
We hypothesise that participation in certification affects nutrition primarily through two 
pathways, namely through effects on income and gender roles within the household. 
Concerning the income pathway, several studies have shown that sustainability standards 
like Fairtrade and Organic can contribute to significant income gains through price 
premiums, reduced risk, and, in some cases, positive productivity effects (Arnould et al., 
2009; Bolwig et al., 2009; Jena et al., 2012; Ruben & Fort, 2012). Holding other things 
constant, income gains are likely to improve food security and dietary quality. 
Concerning the gender pathway, certification may also affect the roles of men and women 
within the household and thus food availability and nutrition. Previous research showed 
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that agricultural commercialization is often associated with women in farm households 
losing control of production and income (von Braun & Kennedy, 1994; Njuki et al., 2011; 
Fischer & Qaim, 2012). However, sustainability standards explicitly try to strengthen 
women‘s role, so that loss of income control may possibly be prevented. For example, the 
promotion of gender equity and ensuring that women‘s work is properly valued and 
equally rewarded is one of the ten key principles of the Fairtrade standard (Fairtrade, 
2009). Similarly, the UTZ code of conduct promotes policies of non-discrimination and 
gender equity by providing gender training and awareness programs to its members and 
extension workers (UTZ, 2009). A few studies show that sustainability standards improve 
women‘s incomes, autonomy, and access to information and cooperative networks 
(Riisgaard et al., 2009; Lyon et al., 2010; Bassett, 2010). 
To formally analyse the two impact pathways, we develop a system of simultaneous 
equations as follows: 
 
𝑁𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀2 (2) 
 
𝐼𝑖 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐶𝑖 + 𝜃2𝑌𝑖 + 𝜀3 (3) 
 
𝐺𝑖 =  𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝐶𝑖 + 𝜔2𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀4 (4) 
 
𝐶𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀5 (5) 
where 𝑁𝑖  is the nutrition indicator of household i, as defined above, 𝐼𝑖  is per capita income, 
and 𝐺𝑖  is gender, which we measure in terms of a dummy that takes a value of one when 
revenue from coffee sales is controlled by a male household member. We hypothesise that 
income and gender are both endogenous and influenced by certification 𝐶𝑖 , as shown in 
equations (3) and (4). 𝐶𝑖  is also endogenous, so that in equation (5) we use farm altitude, 
𝐴𝑖 , as a valid instrument. 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖 , and 𝐿𝑖  are vectors of socioeconomic controls that are 
expected to influence nutrition, income, gender, and certification. 𝜀2, 𝜀3, 𝜀4, and 𝜀5 are 
random error terms that may be correlated. We employ a mixed-process maximum 
likelihood procedure to estimate this system of simultaneous equations (Roodman, 2011). 
. 
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3 Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1 Farm household survey   
We carried out a structured survey of coffee-producing households in Uganda between 
July and September 2012. For the selection of households to be interviewed, we used a 
multi-stage sampling procedure. At first, we contacted the main coffee associations in 
Uganda to obtain lists of existing farmer cooperatives, including information on their 
location, the number of cooperative members, and certification details. Based on these lists 
and visits to many of the locations, we purposively selected three cooperatives for 
inclusion in the study. These cooperatives have similar agro-ecological and infrastructure 
conditions. All three are located in the Central Region of Uganda; two of them in Luwero 
District, and the third in Masaka District. In all three cooperatives, farmers produce only 
Robusta coffee. Luwero and Masaka are among the top four districts that account for over 
50% of Uganda‘s Robusta coffee production. 
All three selected cooperatives had acquired UTZ certification around the year 2007; two 
of them had added a second certification scheme shortly thereafter. At the time of the 
survey, one cooperative had only UTZ; the second had UTZ plus Fairtrade, and the third 
had UTZ plus Organic certification. Farmers have to be member of a cooperative to 
participate in the certification schemes, but not all members of the three cooperatives 
actually participated in certification. Hence, all three cooperatives comprise certified and 
uncertified farm households, based on individual household decisions whether or not to 
participate in the certification schemes. Cooperative management provided us with lists of 
all members, including details on the location of each farm household and their 
participation in certification schemes. In each cooperative, we randomly selected two 
parishes, and in each parish, we randomly selected three villages. In these villages, we 
randomly selected households for the interviews. 
In total, we interviewed 271 certified households. Of these, 108 households were certified 
under UTZ and Fairtrade, 101 under UTZ and Organic, and 62 only under UTZ. In 
addition to these certified households, we randomly selected a control group of 148 non-
certified farm households in the same villages. Some of these control households were 
cooperative members while others were not. The total sample size is 419. 
All farm households in the sample were interviewed with a structured questionnaire by a 
small team of local enumerators that were carefully selected, trained, and supervised by the 
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researchers. The questionnaire covered all economic activities of households with a 
detailed breakdown for coffee production and marketing. Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics of sampled households, disaggregated by certification status. 
We find a few significant differences between certified and non-certified households. The 
heads of certified households are older and have longer experience with coffee cultivation. 
Certified farmers also have more land and larger houses, measured in terms of the number 
of rooms. They are located closer to all-weather roads than non-certified farmers and have 
slightly higher incomes. We proxy income by per capita expenditure levels, which is 
considered a better indicator of household living standard in the development economics 
literature. As explained above, we use altitude as an instrument for certification status. 
Certified farms are located in somewhat lower altitudes than non-certified farms. This 
difference is statistically significant but relatively small in magnitude..  
Table 2. Summary statistics by certification status 






 Mean  S.D. Mean  S.D. 
Household and farm characteristics      
Male household head (dummy) 0.791 0.408 0.738 0.441  
Age of household head (years) 47.378 15.444 55.432 12.816 
***
 
Education of household head (years) 6.534 3.329 6.590 3.785  
Cellphone ownership (dummy) 0.750 0.434 0.775 0.418  
Household size (AE) 4.848 2.930 5.360 2.683  
Number of rooms 4.128 1.481 4.613 1.508 
**
 
Years growing coffee 16.662 12.745 26.786 15.590 
***
 
Total land owned (acres) 4.533 3.296 6.220 4.702 
***
 
Number of rooms (5 years ago) 3.757 1.519 4.557 2.237 
***
 
Per capita expenditure per day (UGX) 3176.39 1582.18 3579.32 1821.21 
*
 
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) 4.344 3.496 5.995 5.287 
***
 
Farm altitude (m) 1210.03 47.698 1168.85 71.652 
***
 
Distance to all-weather road (km) 18.793 15.401 14.998 8.307 
**
 
Control of coffee activities:       
Males control production (dummy) 0.574 0.496 0.369 0.483 
***
 
Males controls revenue (dummy) 0.601 0.491 0.439 0.497 
**
 
Notes: UGX, Ugandan Shillings; AE, adult equivalent; S.D., standard deviation. Differences in mean values are tested for 
statistically significant differences; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
3.2 Gender roles in coffee production  
To better understand intra-household relations and decision making, respondents were 
asked to identify who in the household is the primary decision maker for coffee production 
activities (e.g. weeding, harvesting) and in control of coffee revenues (e.g., who keeps it 
and decides how it is spent). The decisions were categorized as being made by (i) male-
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head (alone), (ii) the female spouse or head (alone), and (iii) jointly (i.e. household head 
with the spouse and/or any other male or female member of the family). The lower part of 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for these gender role responses. In certified 
households, women have significantly more control of coffee production activities and 
revenues than in non-certified households. In 56 per cent of the certified households, 
women control coffee revenues either alone or together with a male household member 
(Figure 2). This is a first indication that certification may have a positive influence on 
women‘s empowerment, although this comparison is not yet proof of causality. 
 
Figure 2. Male and female control of coffee production and revenues for certified and non-
certified households 
 
To further examine potential effects of sustainability certification on gender roles, we 
analyse the relationship between the duration of being certified and gender control of 
coffee production and revenues in Figure 3. This is possible with the cross-section survey 
data, because households in the sample were certified at different points in time. The 
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longer households have been certified, the less likely it is that males alone control coffee 
production and revenues. This supports the hypothesis that certification contributes to 
profound behavioural changes towards gender equity in participating households. 
Figure 3. Relationship between duration of certification and gender control of coffee 
production and revenues 
Notes: Fitted values are predictions based on simple linear regressions with proportion of male control or 
both spouses as dependent variable and length of certification as independent variables (CI confidence 
interval). 0 years represent non-certified farmers. 
 
3.3 Household nutrition by certification 
Next, we compare nutritional indicators between certified and non-certified households. 
Table 3 shows levels of consumption, deficiency, and depth of deficiency for calories, iron, 
zinc, and vitamin A. The numbers confirm that food insecurity and micronutrient 
malnutrition are widespread problems among coffee farmers in Uganda, affecting more 
than 40 per cent of the households. Notable differences are observed between certified and 
non-certified households. Certified households have higher mean calorie and micronutrient 
consumption levels. They also have lower levels of nutritional deficiencies. Whether or not 
these differences can be interpreted as causal effects of certification will be analysed in the 
next section. 
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Table 3. Households‘ calorie and micronutrient consumption 
 Non-certified Certified  
 Mean  S.D. Mean  S.D. Difference 
Calories:      
Daily consumption (kcal/AE) 2867.710 1408.336 3151.453 1353.307 
*
 
Prevalence of deficiency (%) 0.439 0.498 0.354 0.479  
Depth of deficiency (%) 0.289 0.204 0.217 0.148 
*
 
Iron:      
Daily consumption (mg/AE) 20.722 10.770 23.266 11.324 
*
 
Prevalence of deficiency (%) 0.486 0.502 0.395 0.490  
Depth of deficiency (%) 0.344 0.225 0.248 0.152 
***
 
Zinc:      
Daily consumption (mg/AE) 10.661 5.974 12.263 6.392 
*
 
Prevalence of deficiency (%) 0.784 0.413 0.745 0.436  
Depth of deficiency (%) 0.460 0.220 0.379 0.192 
***
 
Vitamin A:      
Daily consumption (μg RE/AE) 1203.388 1218.732 1266.426 1148.831  
Prevalence of deficiency (%) 0.358 0.481 0.303 0.460  
Depth of deficiency (%) 0.455 0.276 0.437 0.269  
Notes: AE, adult equivalent; S.D., standard deviation; RE, retinol equivalent. Differences in mean values are tested for 
statistically significant differences; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Descriptive statistics in this section have shown that certification is associated with men 
having less control for coffee incomes and higher consumption of calories and supply of 
micronutrients. This suggests that certification might have a positive impact on household 
food security and nutrition. However, these differences are merely descriptive in nature 
and do not prove causal relationships as there could be systematic differences that affect 
both certification and household nutrition. Therefore, to address this endogeneity problem, 
we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to properly analyze the treatment effects of 
certification while controlling for other factors in the next section. 
4 Econometric results  
4.1 Impact of certification on nutrition 
We start this analysis by specifying and estimating the reduced-form model in equation (1). 
In separate regressions, we use the consumption of calories, iron, zinc, and vitamin A per 
AE as dependent variables. Certification is used as the treatment variable on the right-hand 
side, together with a vector of controls. As control variables, we include gender, age, and 
education of the household head, household size, and infrastructure conditions, which may 
all affect nutrition. Furthermore, we include two asset variables – farm size and number of 
rooms in the house – as proxies for household wealth. Wealth may be influenced by 
certification, which could lead to issues of reverse causality. We use values lagged by five 
years, thus referring to 2007 (the other values refer to 2012 when the survey was 
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conducted). Most households in the sample were not certified before 2007; hence, we 
reduce possible issues of reverse causality. 
As explained above, we specify the treatment variable in two different ways, as a 
certification dummy and as a continuous variable measuring the number of years that a 
farm household has been certified. Table 4 shows the estimation results for the models 
with the certification dummy. These estimates are based on an IV estimator, using farm 
altitude as instrument for certification. For comparison, OLS results are shown in Table 
A1, whereas first-stage results of the IV models are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics are significant for all models, suggesting that the 
IV models are preferred due to the endogeneity of the certification dummy.  













Second stage      







 (327.795) (2.418) (1.217) (307.128) 
Male household head (dummy) -140.605 -1.656 -0.295 -140.829 
 (149.889) (1.265) (0.727) (142.071) 
Age of household head (years) 6.347 0.030 0.015 -0.379 
 (5.248) (0.043) (0.024) (4.960) 









 (18.165) (0.153) (0.088) (17.217) 







 (22.849) (0.192) (0.110) (21.651) 
Number of rooms (5 years ago) 55.714
*
 0.119 -0.141 25.484 
 (32.243) (0.270) (0.155) (30.542) 
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) 8.465 0.003 0.086 -3.292 
 (13.929) (0.117) (0.067) (13.193) 

















 (327.200) (2.758) (1.583) (310.105) 
Observations 419 419 419 419 
Log likelihood -3789 -1781 -1540 -3762 










Notes: AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The results in Table 3 show that certification has a positive and significant effect on the 
consumption of calories, iron, and zinc. Controlling for other factors, certified households 
consume 541 kcal more per AE and day, which implies a 19 per cent increase over mean 
consumption levels of non-certified households. Certified households also consume 7.3 
mg/AE more iron and 5.1 mg/AE more zinc, representing increases relative to non-
certified households of 35 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively. Also for vitamin A, we 
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observe a positive effect of certification, although this coefficient is not statistically 
significant. These results suggest that participation in sustainability certification improves 
food security and dietary quality among coffee farmers in Uganda. This is similar to what 
has been shown for horticultural farm households in Kenya by Becchetti & Costantino 
(2008), who had used simpler measures of dietary quality. 
The results in Table 5 use the same reduced-form models, but now with the duration of 
certification as a continuous treatment variable. Also for these models, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test statistics suggest that the IV estimator is preferred over OLS. As can be seen, 
each additional year that a household is certified increases the consumption of calories and 
all three micronutrients. In these models, the effect for vitamin A is significant as well. It 
appears that certification does not only lead to a one-time positive shift, but to steady 
improvements in nutrition, which may be related to induced behavioural changes within 
the coffee-producing households. 













Second stage      









 (58.189) (0.519) (0.302) (56.897) 
Male household head (dummy) -111.271 -1.248 0.045 -110.718 
 (164.769) (1.404) (0.812) (167.292) 
Age of household head (years) 6.591 0.033 0.012 -0.713 
 (4.945) (0.042) (0.025) (5.104) 
Education of household head (years) -27.347 -0.284 -0.160 -35.228
**
 
 (19.916) (0.176) (0.105) (16.489) 









 (25.976) (0.232) (0.140) (21.170) 
Number of rooms (5 years ago) 64.004
*
 0.230 -0.068 31.655 
 (38.022) (0.359) (0.175) (28.794) 
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) 6.520 -0.025 0.057 -5.891 
 (15.166) (0.122) (0.083) (9.816) 

















 (336.352) (2.895) (1.670) (370.882) 
Observations 419 419 419 419 










Notes: AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
4.2 Impact pathways  
Results from the reduced-form models revealed that sustainability certification and the 
duration of certification are both positively associated with higher calorie and 
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micronutrient consumption in coffee-producing households. We now turn to the analysis of 
possible impact pathways, estimating the simultaneous equation system shown in 
equations (2) to (5). Again, we use two different treatment variables, namely the 
certification dummy and the duration of certification as a continuous variable. The main 
results for the dummy specification are summarised in Table 6 (full results are shown in 
Table A3 in the Appendix). 





















 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) 









 (198.861) (1.687) (0.930) (198.880) 
Per capita expenditure per day(UGX) 









 (544.917) (544.884) (544.798) (544.950) 
Male controls revenue (dummy) 









 (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) 
Household certified (dummy)     









 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: UGX, Ugandan Shillings; AE, Adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with standard 
errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The first two rows in Table 6 show how household expenditure (income) and gender roles 
affect calorie and micronutrient consumption. Each additional UGX (Ugandan shilling) of 
daily per capita expenditure increases calorie consumption by 0.306 kcal/AE; that is, an 
additional 1000 UGX (about 0.38 US$) increases calorie consumption by 306 kcal per day. 
Per capita expenditure levels also have a positive impact on iron and zinc consumption, 
whereas the effect for vitamin A is not statistically significant. Other studies with data 
from rural households in Africa have also shown that vitamin A consumption is often less 
responsive to income changes than iron or zinc consumption (Ecker & Qaim, 2011). On 
the other hand, gender roles within the household have a significant effect on all nutrition 
indicators, including vitamin A. If a male household member controls the revenue from 
coffee sales (as compared to female or joint control), calorie consumption is reduced by 
664 kcal, equivalent to 23 per cent of mean calorie consumption levels. Iron, zinc, and 
vitamin A consumption are also reduced considerably through male control of coffee 
revenues. This is consistent with the literature showing that men and women often spend 
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income on different types of goods, as discussed above (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; 
Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003). 
The other rows in Table 6 show that certification significantly affects household 
expenditure (income) and gender roles, confirming the two main hypothesised impact 
pathways. Per capita expenditure levels and women‘s empowerment are positively 
influenced through certification. When a household is certified, the probability that a male 
alone controls coffee revenues is reduced by 0.66. This is a very strong effect that may be 
explained by two factors. First, as discussed above, some of the sustainability standards 
promote gender equity through special training, awareness building, and other gender 
mainstreaming activities. Second, certified coffee production with stricter standards 
increases the demand for labour, so that female household members become increasingly 
involved in the coffee crop. More female labour spent on coffee production seems to 
improve women‘s bargaining power and their influence on decision-making.  
Table 7 summarises the results for the simultaneous equation system using the duration of 
certification as continuous treatment variable (full results are shown in Table A4 in the 
Appendix). These estimates are consistent with the findings so far. Each additional year 
that a household is certified increases per capita expenditures by about 500 UGX per day 
and reduces the probability of male revenue control by 0.09. These results point at learning 
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Main pathway     







 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) 









 (198.959) (1.688) (0.930) (198.909) 
Per capita expenditure per day(UGX)   









 (81.421) (81.420) (81.396) (81.408) 
Male controls revenue (dummy)     









 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Number of years certified      









 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Notes: UGX, Ugandan Shillings; AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with standard 
errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Global food systems are undergoing a rapid transformation, with voluntary sustainability 
standards and certification schemes gaining in importance. Smallholder farmers in 
developing countries may potentially benefit from such standards. Previous research had 
analysed impacts of smallholder participation in sustainability-oriented certification 
schemes in terms of output prices, profits, and incomes. Impacts on household nutrition 
have hardly been evaluated. We have addressed this shortcoming, using survey data from 
smallholder coffee farmers in Uganda who participate in Fairtrade, Organic, and UTZ 
certification schemes. Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we have 
analysed impacts on household food security and dietary quality, building on various 
indicators constructed from comprehensive food consumption data. Second, we have 
developed and estimated systems of simultaneous equations to analyse impact pathways 
with a particular focus on income and gender roles within farm households. The 
approaches developed may also be useful for impact evaluation in other contexts, thus 
contributing to the broader research direction on agriculture-nutrition linkages. 
The empirical results suggest that sustainability standards in the coffee market have 
positive impacts on food security and dietary quality for smallholder farmers in Uganda. 
Controlling for other factors, participation in the certification schemes has increased 
household consumption of calories, iron, and zinc by 19 per cent, 35 per cent, and 48 per 
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cent, respectively. In terms of impact pathways, we have shown that sustainability 
certification increases household incomes and improves gender equity. Both these factors 
contribute to improved nutrition. 
The gender effects are particularly noteworthy. Agricultural commercialization often 
contributes to women losing control of farm production and revenues, sometimes with 
negative marginal effects for household nutrition. The reason is that women tend to spend 
a greater share of their income on family nutrition and health than men. Our results 
demonstrate that this loss of female control can be prevented and even reversed when 
measures to promote gender equity are integrated into market linkage initiatives. 
Sustainability standards vary in their concrete measures and approaches, but their codes of 
conduct generally emphasise zero tolerance to discrimination, marginalisation, and unfair 
treatment of family members and workers employed on certified farms. 
In addition to the structured survey that we implemented, we conducted several focus 
group discussions with certified and non-certified farmers, separately for men and women. 
These discussions confirm the results from the quantitative analysis. Spouses of male 
farmers often stated that intra-household gender relations have changed indeed through 
certification; many had received training courses on coffee production, marketing, and 
gender issues. Cooperatives with certification are also hiring more women as extension 
workers and foster equal representation of women in the leadership structure. In some 
cases, payments for coffee delivered to the cooperative are only made if both spouses are 
present. This improves transparency and women‘s involvement in decisions on how to 
spend the income. The econometric results suggest that women‘s empowerment further 
increases with the duration of certification, pointing at positive and profound behavioural 
changes. 
Of course, the results from certified coffee farmers in Uganda should not simply be 
generalized. Nevertheless, we cautiously conclude that sustainability standards can 
contribute to improved livelihoods of smallholder farm households, including higher 
incomes, better nutrition, and improved gender equity. One shortcoming of our analysis is 
that it builds on cross-section data, so that not all possible biasing factors may be 
eliminated completely. Follow-up research with panel data may help to further increase the 
robustness of the results on impacts, impact pathways, and impact dynamics..   
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 (147.263) (1.187) (0.671) (136.665) 
Male household head (dummy) -149.478 -1.815 -0.415 -156.034 
 (160.556) (1.316) (0.729) (160.079) 







 (4.675) (0.038) (0.022) (4.629) 







 (19.870) (0.170) (0.100) (16.120) 







 (24.359) (0.204) (0.117) (19.401) 
Number of rooms (5 years ago) 61.838 0.229 -0.058 35.979 
 (38.536) (0.350) (0.161) (26.737) 
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) 11.278 0.053 0.124 1.529 
 (14.868) (0.117) (0.081) (9.716) 

















 (325.108) (2.628) (1.446) (359.014) 
Observations 419 419 419 419 
Log likelihood -3574.6 -1567.8 -1329.4 -3548.1 
Notes: AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 













Household certified (dummy)     









 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male household head (dummy) 0.011 0.024 0.032 0.029 
 (0.173) (0.174) (0.173) (0.174) 









 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 









 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Household size (AE) 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 









 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 



















 (1.378) (1.361) (1.348) (1.355) 
Observations 419 419 419 419 
Log likelihood -3789.4 -1780.9 -1540.0 -3762.1 
Chi-square 105.6 83.70 82.61 16.22 
Notes: AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Main pathways     
Per capita expenditure per day(UGX) 0.306*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.045 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) 
Male controls coffee revenue (dummy) -664.215*** -6.525*** -2.346** -557.335*** 
 (198.861) (1.687) (0.930) (198.880) 
Age of household head (years) 10.990*** 0.078** 0.052*** 2.425 
 (4.177) (0.036) (0.019) (4.157) 
Education of household head (years) -50.154*** -0.475*** -0.293*** -35.948** 
 (16.678) (0.142) (0.078) (16.600) 
Household size (AE) -143.113*** -0.984*** -0.429*** -26.626 
 (21.302) (0.181) (0.099) (21.203) 
Constant 2822.138*** 22.227*** 8.979*** 1612.469*** 
 (330.871) (2.813) (1.544) (329.669) 
Per capita expenditure per day(UGX)     
Household certified (dummy) 4513.056*** 4521.814*** 4546.756*** 4496.279*** 
 (544.917) (544.884) (544.798) (544.950) 
Male household head (dummy) 797.429*** 797.627*** 799.837*** 794.281*** 
 (249.419) (249.419) (249.415) (249.413) 
Age of household head (years) -35.859*** -35.935*** -36.183*** -35.728*** 
 (8.738) (8.738) (8.737) (8.738) 
Education of household head (years) 56.040* 55.985* 55.627* 56.194* 
 (30.261) (30.261) (30.260) (30.261) 
Household size (AE) -247.584*** -247.686*** -248.186*** -247.360*** 
 (37.944) (37.944) (37.944) (37.944) 
Total land owned (acres) -7.789 -7.909 -7.582 -7.413 
 (24.496) (24.494) (24.487) (24.494) 
Constant 2779.785*** 2779.556*** 2777.872*** 2781.876*** 
 (525.447) (525.447) (525.446) (525.446) 
Male controls coffee revenue (dummy)     
Household certified (dummy) -0.657*** -0.669*** -0.680*** -0.661*** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) 
Age of household head (years) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education of household head (years) 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household size (AE) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 0.703*** 0.704*** 0.704*** 0.703*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Household certified (dummy)     
Farm altitude (m) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male household head (dummy) -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.192*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Age of household head (years) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education of household head (years) 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household size (AE) 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of rooms (5 years ago) 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Distance to all-weather road (km) -0.003* -0.003* -0.003 -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 1.275*** 1.290*** 1.322*** 1.289*** 
 (0.361) (0.361) (0.361) (0.361) 
Notes: UGX, Ugandan Shillings; AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Main pathway     
Per capita expenditure per day(UGX) 0.311*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.044 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) 
Male controls coffee revenue (dummy) -659.761*** -6.499*** -2.397*** -549.158*** 
 (199.044) (1.689) (0.930) (198.984) 
Age of household head (years) 10.991*** 0.078** 0.052*** 2.463 
 (4.177) (0.036) (0.019) (4.157) 
Education of household head (years) -50.710*** -0.482*** -0.298*** -35.922** 
 (16.677) (0.142) (0.078) (16.599) 
Household size (AE) -142.338*** -0.974*** -0.421*** -26.709 
 (21.301) (0.181) (0.099) (21.201) 
Constant 2803.677*** 21.998*** 8.847*** 1610.003*** 
 (330.895) (2.813) (1.543) (329.662) 
Per capita expenditure per day(UGX)     
Number of years certified 591.266*** 592.245*** 600.202*** 587.966*** 
 (82.935) (82.934) (82.907) (82.918) 
Male household head (dummy) 714.522*** 714.580*** 719.767*** 710.541*** 
 (239.115) (239.116) (239.111) (239.103) 
Age of household head (years) -19.381** -19.423** -19.755*** -19.274** 
 (7.658) (7.658) (7.658) (7.658) 
Education of household head (years) 93.798*** 93.792*** 93.605*** 93.817*** 
 (28.501) (28.501) (28.501) (28.501) 
Household size (AE) -240.304*** -240.403*** -241.317*** -240.005*** 
 (36.177) (36.177) (36.176) (36.177) 
Total land owned (acres) -2.615 -2.617 -2.645 -2.117 
 (23.894) (23.892) (23.881) (23.890) 
Constant 2636.900*** 2636.446*** 2629.927*** 2640.669*** 
 (501.673) (501.673) (501.670) (501.669) 
Male controls coffee revenue (dummy)     
Number of years certified -0.097*** -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.096*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Age of household head (years) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education of household head (years) 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household size (AE) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 0.736*** 0.737*** 0.738*** 0.736*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Number of years certified     
Farm altitude (m) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Male household head (dummy) -1.136*** -1.134*** -1.130*** -1.124*** 
 (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) 
Age of household head (years) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Education of household head (years) 0.064* 0.065* 0.066* 0.064* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Household size (AE) 0.086* 0.086* 0.085* 0.086* 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Total land owned 5 years ago (acres) 0.033 0.031 0.034 0.032 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Number of rooms (5 years ago) 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.147*** 0.158*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Distance to all-weather road (km) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 12.933*** 13.105*** 13.303*** 13.019*** 
 (2.220) (2.219) (2.219) (2.216) 
Notes: UGX, Ugandan Shillings; AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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This study compares risk attitudes of smallholder farmers elicited from two different 
lottery designs (i) with fixed payoffs and changing probabilities and (ii) with fixed 
probabilities and changing payoffs. We utilize experimental data collected from 332 
randomly selected smallholder farmers in Uganda. Both methods reveal high proportions 
of farmers who are classified as risk averse. However, comparing the different risk attitude 
categories shows that the two elicitation methods yield significantly different results. 
Furthermore, we find relatively low inconsistency rates in the response behavior for the 
two methods compared to other studies in the past. Specific socio-demographic and socio-
economic characteristics also affect farmers‘ risk attitudes.  
Key words 
Elicitation of risk attitude, inconsistency rates, laboratory experiment in the field, Uganda. 
JEL classification  
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Developing Countries: An Experimental Analysis of Farmers‘ Risk Attitude and Investment Behavior‖.  
Chapter IV. Do Changing Probabilities or Payoffs in Lottery-Choice Experiments         65  






1 Introduction  
The majority of people in developing countries rely on agriculture as their main source of 
livelihood and often perform in precarious and risky conditions. In agricultural production, 
where farmers‘ crop yields and incomes are dependent on various exogenous factors such 
as weather conditions and price fluctuations respectively, risk is ubiquitous in farming 
decisions (Menapace et al. 2012). Ultimately, risk plays a significant role in almost every 
important economic farm decision such as crop selection (Price and Wetzstein 1999), 
technology adoption (Purvis et al. 1995), conservation intervention (Winter-Nelson and 
Amegbeto 1998), and crop insurance markets (Hill and Viceisza 2012). However, people 
naturally differ in the way they make risky decisions, and these differences are often 
described as differences in risk attitude. Therefore, understanding the risk attitude of 
economic agents provides useful insights in understanding their economic behavior 
(Reynaud and Couture 2012). From a policy-maker‘s perspective, it is imperative to 
understand farmers‘ risk attitudes in order to gain insight of how risk affects the decision 
behavior and to predict this behavior under different policy conditions (Bhattamishra and 
Barrett 2010). Harrison (2011) notes that welfare evaluation of any proposed policy with 
risky outcomes should consider people‘s risk attitudes. As a result, many researchers have 
studied individual risk attitudes, and a variety of methods have been used for testing risk 
attitudes in laboratory and field settings.  
There is extensive literature regarding the elicitation of individuals‘ risk attitudes in both 
developed and developing countries. A variety of methods has evolved for testing these 
attitudes, including lottery choice task decisions (eg., Holt and Laury 2002), self-
assessment questions (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011), hypothetical gambles (e.g., Anderson and 
Mellor 2009), and willingness to pay analyses (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1990). Studies that 
explored risk attitudes of individuals in a developed country setting include among others 
Holt and Laury (2002), Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008), Dave et al. (2010), and 
Reynaud and Couture (2012). The studies conducted by Binswanger (1980), Humphrey 
and Verschoor (2004), Jacobson and Petrie (2009), Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009), and 
Harrison et al. (2010) examined risk attitudes of individuals in a developing country 
context. A troubling result of previous investigations is that often risk attitudes of an 
individual vary significantly across different elicitation methods (Isaac and James 2000; 
Andersen et al. 2006; Dave et al. 2010; Reynaud and Couture 2012). Several reasons have 
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been offered to explain this behavior, including context dependency (Reynaud and Couture 
2012), differences in cognitive abilities of subjects and task complexity (Anderson and 
Mellor 2009), and non-expected utility preferences (Starmer 2000). Furthermore, several 
developing country field studies utilizing complex risk attitude elicitation methods, 
including lottery choice task decisions, reported relatively high inconsistency rates in 
individuals‘ response behavior, which may indicate a low level of comprehension (e.g., 
Galarza 2009; Jacobson and Petrie 2009; Doerr et al. 2011; Engle-Warnick et al. 2011). As 
a result, inconsistent subjects are usually excluded from the analysis, which often means 
excluding a large portion of the data. These problems show that there is a danger that risk 
attitudes are not estimated correctly and consequently might result in different policy 
recommendations. Therefore, a valid measure of risk attitudes is a critical input for 
properly designing effective policy instruments in the agricultural sector as well as for an 
adequate single-farm decision support. It can support quantifying optimal portfolios, 
introducing efficient risk prevention policies and designing optimal insurance instruments 
(Gollier 2001; Harrison et al. 2005a).  
In the last decade, the Holt and Laury lottery (HLL hereafter) has virtually become the 
standard method for the elicitation of subjective risk attitudes. It has been used in a great 
variety of contexts and with different subject groups, including convenience groups such as 
students (e.g., Andersen et al. 2006; Deck et al. 2008; Abdellaoui et al. 2011) and real 
decision-makers such as managers (e.g., Masclet et al. 2009; Holm et al. 2012). Brick et al. 
(2012) applied a similar design to that of Holt and Laury (2002) but differs in that, instead 
of changing probabilities and fixing payoffs, probabilities are fixed and payoffs change 
(BL hereafter). Brick et al. (2012) assumed that people have more difficulties with varying 
probabilities than with varying amounts of payoffs and thus modified the HLL 
accordingly.  
The objectives of this study are twofold: First, we compare two different risk attitude 
elicitation methods to answer the questions of how the choice of method affects the results 
and how well these methods are understood by individuals in a rural, developing country 
setting. Specifically, we evaluate the consistency of risk measures in the two elicitation 
methods as well as the inconsistency rates in the response behavior. Our risk attitude 
elicitation methods are based on the well-known incentive-compatible lotteries used in 
Holt and Laury (2002) and Brick et al. (2012), in which subjects were given a series of 
choices between two systematically varied options. The two methods differ in the variation 
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of probabilities and the fixing of payoffs or vice versa. In our experiment, both risk attitude 
elicitation methods are modified from the original lottery-choice experiments by replacing 
probabilities expressed in percent with images of bags of colored balls to represent 
probabilities of different payoffs and henceforth are described as modified HLL and 
modified BL. Conducting a standard HLL and BL with individuals in a rural developing 
country setting might not be appropriate; thus, we incorporated a modification aiming to 
reduce inconsistency rates and to provide more reliable measures of risk attitudes. Second, 
we identify and compare influencing socio-demographic and socio-economic factors of 
risk attitudes across the two elicitation methods. This allows us to check the robustness of 
explanatory factors of risk attitudes and examine whether these factors vary depending on 
the elicitation method. Specifically, this study focuses on a sample of smallholder farmers 
in Uganda, a setting in which the importance of risk in influencing economic behavior of 
poor households has been documented (Hill 2009, 2010). To achieve these objectives, we 
combine data generated from lottery-choice experiments with comprehensive household 
survey data which were collected in Uganda from July to August 2012. 
Our study contributes to the extant literature by addressing the following two aspects: First, 
to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to compare the effects of changing 
probabilities while keeping payoffs constant or vice versa on risk attitudes based on the 
Holt and Laury (2002) and Brick et al. (2012) experimental designs, using the same sample 
of subjects. This comparison may add to the knowledge on which method may work better 
in a developing country context. Second, our work extends the previous research by 
proposing an adequately experimental design to measure risk attitudes of people with a 
limited level of education, which may be used as an appropriate elicitation tool within a 
developing country context.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant 
literature from which the research hypotheses are derived. In Section 3, we explain the two 
risk attitude elicitation methods used to measure the risk attitudes. The sampling 
procedure, incentive design, and the experimental implementation are described in detail in 
Section 4. We present and discuss our findings in Section 5, and lastly, Section 6 concludes 
this paper.   
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2 Literature review and hypotheses 
The existing literature on risk behavior suggests various methods to measure risk attitude, 
but only few studies compare different elicitation methods, in particular, for data collected 
in developing countries among resource-poor farmers. Binswanger (1980) measured the 
risk attitudes of Indian farmers by using two different methods, a hypothetical 
questionnaire and an experimental gambling method with real payoffs, and discovered 
inconsistencies in the measures of risk aversion in the two methods. Reynaud and Couture 
(2012) compared two different risk elicitation methods, namely the Holt and Laury (2002) 
and the Eckel and Grossman (2008) lottery tasks, on a sample of French farmers. They 
found that the risk preference measures were affected by the type of method used and 
demonstrated that risk attitudes were context-dependent. However, both lotteries applied 
were not incentive-compatible. Charness and Viceisza (2011) compared three distinct non-
incentivized elicitation methods, the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery tasks, an adaptation of a 
simple binary method initially proposed by Gneezy and Potters (1997), and a willingness-
to-risk scale pioneered by Dohmen et al. (2011) using a sample drawn from the rural 
population in Senegal. The results indicated that the simple binary method had 
substantially more predictive power compared to the HLL, which revealed a relatively low 
level of understanding. The willingness-to-risk question generated results that were 
unlikely to be accurate according to patterns in other risk attitude elicitation studies. Dave 
et al. (2010) used two different elicitation methods with different degrees of difficulty and 
also came to a similar conclusion. They analyzed how and when a simpler but coarser risk 
attitude elicitation method may be preferred to a more complex but finer one. They found 
that the more complex method had superior predictive accuracy, but had the disadvantage 
that participants made inconsistent choices. Andersen et al. (2006) examined the properties 
of the multiple price list method as well as some variants on the basic design and found 
that the elicitation of risk attitudes was sensitive to procedures, subject pools, and the 
format of the multiple price list tables. They recruited a sample from Denmark. Maart-
Noelck and Musshoff (2013) applied the incentive-compatible HLL and two psychometric 
methods on a sample of German students and German and Kazakhstani farmers and found 
that students responded consistently across all three elicitation methods, whereas German 
farmers, and especially Kazakhstani farmers, were more inconsistent. Thus far, it has not 
been investigated how risk attitudes assessed by two different risk attitude elicitation 
methods differing in the variation of probabilities or payoffs based on Holt and Laury 
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(2002) and Brick et al. (2012) compare to each other in a within-sample experiment. 
Therefore, we analyze the consistency of risk measures across the two different elicitation 
methods which we have used and adapted to individuals in a rural developing setting. We 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
H1 „Modified HLL vs. modified BL‟: There is a consistency between the risk attitude 
determined in the modified HLL and the response behavior in the modified BL.  
Risk attitudes measured in lottery choice task decisions are usually based on the point at 
which participants switch from the safe option to the risky one. A common problem with 
such designs is that when participants fail to understand a task, they tend to switch back 
and forth between the lottery options as they move down the decision rows. This makes a 
risk measure based on a switching point from risky to safe lottery option problematic. 
Multiple switching behaviors have been observed in numerous studies using the HLL, but 
were especially prevalent in a developing country context. Galarza (2009) observed an 
inconsistency rate of 52% in a study conducted with Peruvian cotton farmers. Jacobson and 
Petrie (2009) found that approximately 55% of Rwandan participants made at least one 
inconsistent switch. The experiment was conducted with a random sample of the adult 
population in Rwanda. Brick et al. (2012) found that about 41% of the sample of South 
African fishers showed multiple switching behaviors, and Charness and Viceisza (2011) 
found that 51% of the participating farmers in Senegal switched lotteries at least twice. De 
Brauw and Eozenou (2011) found an inconsistency rate of 14% among Mozambican 
farmers, which matched with most case studies of developed countries which had lower 
inconsistency rates. Holt and Laury (2002) found an inconsistency rate of 13% for students 
in the United States, and Dave et al. (2010) found an inconsistency rate of 8.5% for an 
adult population in Canada. The relatively large proportion of participants in developing 
countries that made inconsistent choices in lottery choice task decisions could indicate that 
the HLL might not be the most appropriate within this setting. Therefore, we analyze the 
inconsistency rates of the two elicitation methods and evaluate whether the modified BL is 
better able to reduce inconsistencies in the response behavior compared to the modified 
HLL following the argumentation of Brick et al. (2012). Our hypothesis is: 
H2 „Inconsistency rates of modified BL vs. modified HLL‟: The modified BL outperforms 
the modified HLL in reducing the inconsistency rates in the response behavior.  
Individuals‘ characteristics naturally vary and may also have an impact on the risk attitudes 
(Doss et al. 2008). In our study, we focus on specific socio-demographic (age, gender, 
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education, household size and number of dependents, and district) and socio-economic 
characteristics (wealth, farm size, access to a savings account, and access to credit) of 
respondents to examine whether these factors influence their risk attitudes and whether 
these factors are consistent across the two elicitation methods. In the extant literature, there 
is no consensus, which socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics have an 
influence on risk attitudes. Although some studies find that risk attitudes differ 
significantly based on specific characteristics, other studies find no significant relationship. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables and their impact on the risk attitude from 
other studies. Our last hypothesis is as follows: 
H3 „Farmer-specific effects for risk attitude‟: Socio-demographic and socio-economic 
variables have a significant effect on the risk attitude of farmers.  
Table 1 Overview of socio-demographic and socio-economic variables and their impact on 
risk attitude 
Variable Study Impact 
Socio-demographic variables   
Age e.g., Nielsen et al. (2013) 
 




Older individuals are more risk 
averse than younger ones 
No significant effect 
Gender e.g., Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
 




Women are more risk averse than 
men 
No significant effect 
Education  e.g., Harrison et al. (2007) 
 
 





Individuals with higher education 
are more risk averse than those with 
less education  
No significant effect 
Household 
size 
e.g., Miyata (2003) 
 




Individuals with larger households 
are more risk averse 
No significant effect 
Number of 
dependents 
e.g., Hallahan et al. (2004) 
 




Individuals with a larger number of 
dependents are more risk averse 
No significant effect 
Socio-economic variables   
Wealth e.g., Cohen and Einav (2007) 
 




Wealthier individuals are more risk 
averse  
No significant effect 
Farm size e.g., Wik et al. (2004) 
 




Individuals with more land are 
more risk averse 
No significant effect 
Access to a 
savings 
account 
e.g., Jacobson and Petrie (2009) + 
 
Individuals with access to a savings 
account are less risk averse 
Access to 
credit 
e.g., Eswaran and Kotwal (1990) + 
 
Individuals with access to credit are 
less risk averse 
Source: Author‘s own illustration. 
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3 Experiment design  
This section provides an overview of how the experiment was designed. Both risk attitude 
elicitation methods were chosen in a randomly determined order. A complete set of 
instructions for the experiment is included in Appendix 1. The experiment was preceded by 
a household survey that collected information on household demographics and economic 
characteristics. 
3.1 The Holt and Laury lottery and its modification 
In the Holt and Laury (2002) experiment, participants had to make 10 choices between two 
systematically varied options, namely option A (the relatively safer option) or option B 
(the relatively riskier option). In our design, option A offered the chance to either win 
UGX 6,000 or UGX 4,800 with a certain probability, while option B offered the chance to 
win UGX 11,550 or UGX 300 with the same probability (see Table 2). The payoffs in the 
safer option have a lower range than those in the riskier option. We use the rate of 1:3,000 
(which corresponds to the exchange rate) to get the equivalent payoffs in Ugandan 
shillings compared to the original task. The earnings are held constant across the choice 
tasks, whereas the probabilities of the earnings vary in intervals of 10% between the choice 
tasks. The expected values of the options change as participants move from one to the next 
choice task. Up to the fourth choice task, the expected value of the safer option A is higher 
than the expected value of the riskier option B. From the fifth task, the expected value of 
option B exceeded the expected value of option A.  
Participants were asked to make 10 choices of either option A or option B, one for each 
choice task. The switching point from the safer to the riskier option allowed us to 
determine their individual risk attitude. A risk seeking participant would switch to option B 
in the first three decision rows, while a risk averse participant would switch to option B 
between the decision rows five to nine. In turn, a risk neutral participant would always 
decide in favor of the option with the higher expected value. Therefore, the person would 
switch from choosing option A to option B in row five. A HLL-value (= number of safe 
choices) between one and three expresses risk preference, a HLL-value of four implies risk 
neutrality, and a HLL-value between five and 10 expresses risk aversion of the participant. 
Following Holt and Laury (2002), a power risk utility function with a constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) defined over the lottery prize was used to calculate a range of relative 
risk aversion compatible with each choice. The risk utility function is of the form 𝑈 𝑥 =
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(𝑥1−𝑟)/(1 − 𝑟) where 𝑥 is the lottery prize and 𝑟 is the latent risk coefficient. Using this 
utility function, we can calculate the implied bounds of an individual‘s CRRA coefficient. 
For instance, a participant who chose option A six times before switching to option B 
reveals a CRRA coefficient interval between 0.15 and 0.41. Positive values of the CRRA 
coefficient denote risk aversion (𝑟 > 0), a value of zero indicates risk neutralitiy (𝑟 = 0), 
and negative values denote risk seeking (𝑟 < 0).  
Table 2 Payoff matrix of the Holt and Laury lottery 














1 With 10% prize of 6,000     
With 90% prize of 4,800 
With 10% prize of 11,550 
With 90% prize of 300 




2 With 20% prize of 6,000  
With 80% prize of 4,800 
With 20% prize of 11,550 
With 80% prize of 300 




3 With 30% prize of 6,000    
With 70% prize of 4,800 
With 30% prize of 11,550 
With 70% prize of 300 




4 With 40% prize of 6,000   
With 60% prize of 4,800 
With 40% prize of 11,550 
With 60% prize of 300 
5,280 4,800 -0.49 < r 
< -0.14 
RL 
5 With 50% prize of 6,000 
With 50% prize of 4,800 
With 50% prize of 11,550 
With 50% prize of 300 
5,400 5,925 -0.14 < r 
< 0.15 
RN 
6 With 60% prize of 6,000 
With 40% prize of 4,800 
With 60% prize of 11,550 
With 40% prize of 300 




7 With 70% prize of 6,000     
With 30% prize of 4,800 
With 70% prize of 11,550 
With 30% prize of 300 
5,640 8,175 0.41 < r 
 < 0.68 
RA 
8 With 80% prize of 6,000   
With 20% prize of 4,800 
With 80% prize of 11,550 
With 20% prize of 300 




9 With 90% prize of 6,000 
With 10% prize of 4,800 
With 90% prize of 11,550 
With 10% prize of 300 




10 With 100% prize of 6,000 
With 0% prize of 4,800 
With 100% prize of 11,550 
With 0% prize of 300 
6,000 11,550 1.37 < r Extremely 
RA 
Source: Author‘s own illustration according to Holt and Laury (2002).  
Notes: Prizes are displayed in Ugandan shillings (UGX). At the time of the experiments, the exchange rate 
was approximately € 1 to UGX 3,000, so prizes range from approximately € 0.1 to € 3.85. The fourth and 
fifth columns show the expected values (EV) of the respective option.                                                  
a 
Constant relative risk aversion coefficient assuming a power risk utility function.   
b 
RL, RN, and RA respectively for risk lover, neutral, and averse. 
Pretests have shown that to conduct a standard HLL with individuals in a rural developing 
setting like Uganda would not have been feasible. Therefore, we incorporated a 
modification in order to develop an easy to apply and effective method to elicit the risk 
attitude. The standard HLL is modified in this experimental design by replacing 
probabilities expressed in percent with images of bags of colored balls (green, blue, red, 
and yellow) representing probabilities of different payoffs (UGX 300,UGX 4,800, 
UGX 6,000, and UGX 11,550). Each ball measures a 10% probability and each bag 
includes 10 balls. The different payoffs are represented in a different color. Apart from 
using images of bags and balls, the lottery-choice experiment was absolutely identical to 
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the standard HLL, i.e. the same number of tasks and the implied CRRA ranges. The choice 
tasks were presented all at once to the participants. Figure 1 shows the 10 choice tasks the 
participants faced in this lottery.  
 
Source: Author‘s own illustration. 
Fig. 4 Graphical display of the modified Holt and Laury lottery (in Ugandan shillings) 
3.2 The Brick lottery and its modification  
The experimental design used in Brick et al. (2012) is similar to that of Holt and Laury 
(2002), but with one main difference. Instead of keeping payoffs constant and varying the 
probabilities of receiving the high and low outcomes, the probabilities are constant and the 
payoffs are varied. We use the rate of 1:500 to get the equivalent payoffs in Ugandan 
shillings compared to the original task and to adjust to the payoffs of the HLL. For each 
choice task, participants were asked to choose between option A and option B. Fixed 
probabilities of 100% and 50% were used in the experiment. In the first task, for example, 
option A offered a 100% chance to win UGX 10,000, while option B offered a 50% chance 
to either win UGX 10,000 or UGX 0 (see Table 3). The payoff associated with option A 
declines systematically throughout the eight tasks from UGX 10,000 to UGX 1,000, while 
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the payoff for option B remains unchanged and is fixed at UGX 10,000 and UGX 0. A 
highly risk seeking participant would choose option B in the first choice task, while a 
highly risk averse participant would choose option A in the eighth choice task. A risk 
neutral participant would switch from choosing option A to option B after row three.  
Table 3 Payoff matrix of the Brick lottery 
Tas
k 














1 With 100% prize of 10,000 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 
10,000 5,000 r < -1.41 Highly 
RL 
2 With 100% prize of 7,500 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 




3 With 100% prize of 6,000 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 
6,000 5,000 -0.36 < r  
< 0 
RL 
4 With 100% prize of 5,000 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 
5,000 5,000 0 < r  
< 0.24 
RN 
5 With 100% prize of 4,000 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 
4,000 5,000 0.24 < r 
 < 0.42 
Slightly 
RA 
6 With 100% prize of 3,000 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 
3,000 5,000 0.42 < r 
< 0.57 
RA 
7 With 100% prize of 2,000 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 




8 With 100% prize of 1,000 With 50% prize of 10,000 
With 50% prize of 0 
1,000 5,000 r < 0.70 Highly 
RA 
Source: Author‘s own illustration according to Brick et al. (2012). 
Notes: Prizes are displayed in Ugandan shillings (UGX). At the time of the experiments, the exchange rate 
was approximately € 1 to UGX 3,000, so prizes range from approximately € 0.33 to € 3.33. The fourth and 
fifth columns show the expected vales (EV) of the respective option. 
a 
Constant relative risk aversion coefficient assuming a power risk utility function. 
b 
RL, RN, and RA respectively for risk lover, neutral, and averse. 
In our version of the lottery, we use images of bags of colored balls (red, blue, and green) 
representing probabilities of different payoffs (UGX 0, UGX 10,000, and between 
UGX 10,000 and UGX 1,000). Each ball measures a 100% or a 50% probability and each 
bag includes one or two balls. The different payoffs are represented in a different color, 
except for the varying value of the green ball. Apart from using images of bags and balls, 
the lottery-choice experiment was absolutely identical to the standard BL, i.e. the same 
number of tasks and the implied CRRA ranges. The choice tasks were presented all at once 
to the participants. Figure 2 shows the eight choice tasks presented to participants.  
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Source: Author‘s own illustration.  
Fig. 2 Graphical display of the modified Brick lottery (in Ugandan shillings) 
3.3 Household survey 
In addition to the lottery-choice experiments, participants attended a household survey 
during which they completed a comprehensive questionnaire capturing information on the 
household demographic composition and economic activities. The main variables collected 
through the survey were age, gender, education, household size, number of dependents, 
district, per capita household expenditure as a proxy variable for wealth, total land owned, 
access to savings account, and access to credit.  
A participant‘s ability to reason with numbers and probabilities may affect the 
understanding and choice among risky lotteries, and hence, the opportunity to obtain an 
accurate measurement of risk attitudes (Dave et al. 2010). Therefore, we included three 
additional tasks, adapted from Viceisza (2011) and Charness and Viceisza (2011), to assess 
farmers‘ ability to process percentage and probabilistic information and to explore the 
relationship between their decision behavior and the test score in the quiz: (i) ‗Imagine, we 
toss a coin and ‗heads‘ comes up. What comes up if we toss the coin again?‘ Participants 
were faced with three possible answers: heads, tails, one cannot predict exactly. (ii) ‗If the 
chance of winning a prize is 10%, how many people out of 100 would be expected to get 
the prize?‘ Participants had to name the appropriate value. (iii) ‗When you draw the red 
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ball, you win! Look at the two boxes and mark the correct sentence.‘ One box contains two 
red and two blue balls, while the other box contains four red and four blue balls. 
Participants have to decide whether the chance of winning is higher if they choose the first 
box, the second box, or the chance of winning is equal regardless of which box they 
choose.  
4 Data collection 
4.1 Sampling procedure 
Data used in this study was obtained from experiments and a household survey of 332 
smallholder farmers randomly selected from two districts of Masaka and Luwero in 
Uganda from July to August 2012. These two districts, located in the Central Region, have 
been broadly classified as having similar agro-climatic conditions and farming systems. 
For the selection of smallholder farmers to be interviewed, we used a multi-stage sampling 
procedure. At first, we randomly selected parishes and villages. Within each selected 
village, smallholder farmers were then randomly selected using updated, village-level 
household lists. The farmers were then recruited via the local extension service to 
participate in a household survey and an experiment. The invitation to attend our 
experiment was provided orally by the recruiters and contained the date, time, and place of 
the study, a brief and general purpose of the study, and the type of compensation that could 
be expected. None of the farmers refused to participate in the household survey and the 
experiment, which means that our sample does not have a selection bias. The household 
survey took place one day prior to the actual experiments. Our participants were either the 
household head or the spouse because they are those most likely to be faced with risky 
choices and important economic decisions.  
4.2 Experiment implementation  
The 332 smallholder farmers were allocated randomly to groups for the experimental 
sessions. In total, we conducted 56 sessions during the course of 30 days. Two sessions 
were held each day and each session involved a group of six farmers.
2
 All participants 
played both lottery-choice experiments and the order in which they were faced with the 
two experiments was randomly determined. In the experiment, choices made by 
                                                 
2
 However, four farmers were excluded from the analysis. One farmer left before completing all tasks, and 
three farmers participated in the household survey but were not able to undertake (or arrived too late to 
participate) the experiment.    
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participants were not time constrained. On average, the complete session lasted between 60 
and 90 minutes. The experimental sessions were held in several villages and conducted in 
classrooms of local schools or in a meeting room at the main gathering place of a farmers‘ 
group or association. All of the sessions were held in locations which were familiar to the 
farmers and usually within walking distance or accessible by bicycle. The rooms were 
equipped with tables and chairs and were spaced out to prevent conferring among the 
participants. A team of seven local enumerators that were carefully selected conducted all 
of the experimental sessions. One of the enumerators served as the experimenter, and the 
author served as the assistant experimenter. The other enumerators were placed next to the 
participants to record their choices in case participants were illiterate. Each participant had 
their own enumerator. All sessions were conducted in Luganda, one of the main 
indigenous Bantu languages in south central Uganda. Prior to the first session, the 
enumerators were trained on the experiment protocol and how to carefully avoid giving 
specific instructions about how to answer.  
Each experiment session consisted of registration, instruction, practice, decision making, 
and payment. In the beginning of the experiment, each participant received a personal 
number, which randomly determined his/her seat that remained to be the individual‘s 
location throughout the session. The experiment instructions were read aloud to all 
participants as a group by the experimenter and supported by posters of graphical examples 
displayed on a large board at the front of the room to improve the understanding. During 
the presentation of the instructions, participants were encouraged to ask questions about 
any unclear issues. To further facilitate comprehension, we used real bags of colored balls 
representing probabilities of the different payoffs. Each choice task in the experiment was 
conducted in the following way: The assistant experimenter placed the appropriate balls in 
the bags, while the experimenter explained the values attached to each ball. The 
participants then considered their decision and made their choice by pointing to the 
preferred bag on the sheet in front of them, and their enumerator recorded the choice. 
Participants were informed about all parameters and assumptions underlying the 
experiment, and they had to answer some control questions to ensure that they entirely 
understood the instructions. Our overall impression was that our version of the instructions 
was well understood by the participants because of the various interview techniques 
applied, such as visual, oral, and written explanations, as well as the practical 
implementation with real bags and colored balls. Further support of respondents‘ 
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comprehension of the instructions is seen, for example, in the unproblematic answering of 
the control questions during the experiment.  
4.3 Incentive design  
The decisions in the lottery-choice experiments were related to real earnings to ensure 
incentive compatibility of the experiment and to motivate participants to take the tasks 
more seriously. Participants were informed at the beginning of the experiment that when 
they have completed all decision tasks in the respective lottery, one task would be selected 
at random and played out for real money. This random lottery incentive system is 
commonly used in lottery-choice risk experiments (Humphrey and Verschoor 2004). 
Nevertheless, there is an ongoing controversial debate on the use of monetary incentives as 
rewards for participants in experiments and the practice of paying only some participants 
for only some of their decisions. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) found that using high 
financial incentives for a fraction of participants rather than providing small incentives for 
each of the participants often improves participants‘ performance during the experiment. 
We chose one participant at random for payment for each lottery-choice experiment of our 
payment design; hence we had two winners per session. The earning of the participant was 
based on his/her preference expressed between various mutually exclusive options in the 
two lotteries. Each decision task had exactly the same probability to be drawn. The 
potential earning varied between UGX 300 and UGX 11,550 for the modified HLL and 
between UGX 0 and UGX 10,000 for the modified BL. The average payoffs of the two 
lotteries were UGX 6,674 (approximately € 2.2) and UGX 5,687 (approximately € 1.9). 
Furthermore, all participants received a show-up fee of UGX 5,000 as a compensation for 
their time. This compares to one day of casual farm labor wage in this area. Participants 
were paid in cash by the assistant experimenter at the end of the experiment. 
5 Experimental results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 below presents descriptive statistics on socio-demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of participants in the experiment. On average, participants were aged 50.21 
years. Of all participants, 39% were female. The education level of the household head was 
on average 6.67 years of schooling. The average household size and dependency ratio were 
6.56 and 1.51, respectively. Of all participants, 57% were from Masaka district, while 43% 
of them were from Luwero district. In order to assess whether farmers have a basic 
Chapter IV. Do Changing Probabilities or Payoffs in Lottery-Choice Experiments         79  




comprehension of probabilities, we conducted a short quiz composed of three simple 
questions before the experimental session started. On average, each farmer answered two 
out of the three questions correctly. The average annual per capita household expenditure 
was approximately UGX 516,855. The mean farm size for each farmer was about 5.73 
acres. Of all participants, 28% indicated to have access to a savings account, while 43% 
claimed to be able to access financial credit for agricultural activities whenever they need 
it. 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of respondent characteristics (N = 332) 
Variable name Variable definition Mean Std. dev. 
Socio-demographic characteristics   
Age Age in years 50.21 14.28 
Gender Dummy = 1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.39 - 
Education  Years of formal schooling 6.67 3.60 
Household size Number of household members  6.56 3.10 
Dependency ratio Ratio of dependent (less than 15 
years of age or greater than 64) to 
nondependent household members 
1.51 1.18 
District Dummy =1 if from Masaka, 0 = 
Luwero 
0.57 - 
Probability test score number of probability questions 
correctly answered   
2.05 0.78 
Socio-economic characteristics   




Total land owned Total land owned in acresb  5.73 4.53 
Access to a savings account Dummy = 1 if access to a savings 
account, 0 otherwise 
0.28 - 
Access to credit Dummy = 1 if access to credit, 0 
otherwise 
0.43 - 
Source: Survey data. 
a
 At the time of the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately € 1 to UGX 3,000. 
b
 1 acre = 0.40 hectare.  
Figure 3 presents the distribution of safe choices before switching to the risky lottery 
option by elicitation method.
3
 The individual risk attitudes vary between risk seeking and 
strong risk aversion. The histogram of the modified HLL shows a high peak at 5 (the 
average value in the range), while there is a high peak at 4 (the average value in the range) 
and a very high peak at 8 in the histogram of the modified BL. The latter one may be 
explained by the fact that in lottery option B participants had a 50% chance of receiving 
nothing, and thus rather chose the safer option A eight times.  
                                                 
3 
For the participants who showed an inconsistent behavior (i.e. participants who switched at least twice), we 
assumed the HLL-value at which the participant switched for the first time. 
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Source: Survey data.  
a
 Number of safe choices in the HLL: range of 0-3 = risk seeking (CRRA range: -1.71 to -0.14), 4 = risk 
neutral (CRRA range: -0.14 to 0.15), range of 5-10 = risk averse (CRRA range: 0.15 to 1.37).  
b
 Number of safe choices in the BL: range of 0-3 = risk seeking (CRRA range: -1.41 to 0), 4 = risk neutral 
(CRRA range: 0 to 0.24), range of 5-8 = risk averse (CRRA range: 0.24 to 0.70).  
Fig. 3 Distribution of safe choices in the modified HLL (left figure: N= 332) and modified BL 
(right figure: N = 332) 
5.2 Validity test of hypotheses 
Test of H1 ‘Modified HLL vs. modified BL’ 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the two risk attitude elicitation methods. The 
two lotteries reveal that there are slightly more risk-seeking (15.66%) (52), more risk 
neutral (25.30%) (84), and less risk averse (59.04%) (196) participants in the modified BL 
than compared to the modified HLL with 13.55% (45) risk seeking, 9.34% (31) risk 
neutral, and 77.11% (256) risk averse participants. The results of the chi-square tests show 
that there is a significant difference in the proportions of the categories of risk neutral (p < 
0.01) and risk averse participants (p < 0.01) in the two elicitation methods, while there is 
no significant difference in the category of risk seeking participants. Due to the non-normal 
distribution of the number of safe choices, it is more appropriate to use the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test to examine whether there is a statistically difference between the two elicitation 
methods.
4
 The results reveal that there is a statistically significant difference (p < 0.10).
5
 
An additional analysis, which excludes participants who showed an inconsistent response 
                                                 
4
 In order to test whether the distribution of the safe choices are normally distributed and to check robustness, 
we conduct three different tests, namely the Shapiro Francia, the Shapiro Wilk, and the Skewness Kurtosis. 
All three tests show that the distribution of safe choices in the modified HLL and the modified BL are non-
normally distributed (p < 0.05). This finding compels us to use non-parametric test statistics to compare 
whether the two distributions are significantly different from each other (Gardner 1975). 
5
 For making possible the comparison between the two risk attitude elicitation methods, given the differences 
in the number of tasks in each method and the implied CRRA ranges, the number of safe choices are 
converted into percentages of safe choices.   
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behavior (e.g., a multiple switching behavior), generates similar results. Here, we excluded 
19 participants of the modified HLL and 25 participants of the modified BL. Thus, we 
reject H1 „Modified HLL vs. modified BL‟. Essentially, this means that risk attitude 
measures are affected by the type of method used. Although we found inconsistencies in 
the individual risk attitude across the two elicitation methods, the tendency of participants 
being risk averse is the same, which corroborates empirical findings of other studies 
conducted in developing countries (e.g., Jacobson and Petrie 2009; Yesuf and Bluffstone 
2009; Harrison et al. 2010). 
Table 5 Summary statistics of the two risk attitude elicitation methods 
 





Risk seeking  13.55 (0.02) 15.66 (0.02) χ² = 0.59 
Risk neutral  9.34 (0.02) 25.30 (0.02) χ² = 29.9*** 






Mean  52.04  68.83  
z
b
 =  -1.75* Std. dev. 19.58 30.27 
Median 50 75 
Skewness  -0.37 -0.55 
Kurtosis 3.85 2.27 
Source: Survey data. 
Notes: N = 332. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
a
 Due to the difference in scale value, the number of safe choices in the modified HLL (range of 0-10) and 
the modified BL (range of 0-8) are converted into percentages of safe choices for comparison. 
b
 Based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
Test of H2 ‘Inconsistency rates of modified BL vs. modified HLL’ 
To analyze whether the modified BL is better able to reduce inconsistency rates in the 
response behavior compared to the modified HLL, individuals are classified into four 
groups as shown in Table 6. With respect to the modified HLL, the first group 
encompasses participants who first choose option A and at some point switch to option B. 
The second group comprises participants who always choose option B. We assume that 
participants in these two groups understood the lottery and therefore consider them as to be 
consistent. The third group comprises participants who always choose option A. This 
group is considered as to be inconsistent as we think that participants did not completely 
understand the lottery, since they should have switched to option B at the latest in decision 
task 10. In the fourth group there are participants who switch at least twice. With respect to 
the modified BL, the first group also encompasses participants who first choose option A 
and at some point switch to option B. The second group comprises participants who always 
choose option A and the third group comprises participants who always choose option B. 
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Although the third group is consistent in their response behavior, we think that participants 
did not completely understand the lottery, since they should have chosen option A at least 
in the first decision task, which offered a 100% chance to win UGX 10,000. Hence, this 
group is considered as being inconsistent. The last group comprises participants who 
switch at least twice. Also in the modified BL, the first two groups are classified as to be 
consistent, while the last two groups are classified as to be inconsistent in our analysis. 
Table 6 Classification of groups by consistency and inconsistency rate (N = 332) 
 Group Description Modified HLL 
Consistent  
1 Switch once 303 
2 Always choose option B 10 
Inconsistent 
3 Always choose option A 4 
4 Switch at least twice 15 
 Group Description Modified BL 
Consistent 
1 Switch once 185 
2 Always choose option A 122 
Inconsistent 
3 Always choose option B 10 
4 Switch at least twice 15 
Source: Survey data.   
According to this classification scheme, 313 of 332 participants (94.3%) appear to have 
understood the modified HLL. Another 4 participants (1.2%) always chose option A, and 
15 participants (4.5%) switched at least twice. In the modified BL, 307 of 332 participants 
(92.5%) appear to have understood the lottery. Another 10 participants (3.0%) always 
chose option B, and 15 participants (4.5%) switched at least twice. In both risk attitude 
elicitation methods, the inconsistency rates of 5.7% in the modified HLL and 7.5% in the 
modified BL are relatively low compared to other studies in this field (Galarza 2009; 
Jacobson and Petrie 2009; Brick et al. 2012; Charness and Viceisza 2011). The relatively 
low rates of inconsistency may be an indication that our design of the modified HLL and 
the modified BL was well understood by the participants in Uganda. The inconsistency 
rates are even slightly lower in the modified HLL compared to the modified BL. Against 
the assumption of Brick et al. (2012) that people have more difficulties with varying 
probabilities than with varying amounts of payoffs, we do not find any evidence in our 
results given the relatively low rates of inconsistency in both methods. On this basis, we 
reject H2 „Inconsistency rates of modified BL vs. modified HLL‟.  
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Test of H3 ‘Farmer-specific effects for risk attitude’ 
The interval and ordered probit regression models are used to analyze how socio-
demographic and socio-economic factors affect risk attitudes. The interval regression 
model uses the midpoint CRRA coefficients of the modified HLL and the modified BL as 
the dependent variable, while the ordered probit regression model uses the number of times 
a participant chose the safe option in the respective lottery as the dependent variable. We 
use two regression models as a robustness check of the regression results of each of the 
two models. Table 7 presents the results of two interval and two ordered probit regression 
models. 
First, the results show that the effects of socio-demographic and socio-economic factors on 
risk attitudes are the same across the two regression models, confirming robustness of our 
results. For example, education, district, quiz test score, and winner modified BL all 
significantly have an effect on risk attitudes in the interval and ordered probit models. 
Second, all statistically significant explanatory variables (except for quiz test scores in the 
interval regression) of risk attitude vary across the two elicitation methods. For example, 
education has a statistically significant negative effect on risk aversion in the modified BL 
but shows no significant effect in the modified HLL. Third, the results offer insights into 
characteristics significant in increasing or decreasing risk aversion as well as their relative 
impact. The coefficients of district indicate that participants from the Masaka district are 
substantially less risk averse in the modified HLL than compared to participants from the 
Luwero district. Participants who correctly answered more questions in the quiz are 
significantly more risk averse in both elicitation methods in the interval regression. Annual 
per capita household expenditure has a positive impact on risk aversion for both elicitation 
methods. Age, gender, household size, dependency ratio, total land owned, access to a 
savings account, and access to credit show no significant effects.  
The extant literature offers conflicting evidence on how individual characteristics influence 
risk attitude. For example, we found that risk aversion decreases with education, which is 
contradictory to other studies (e.g., Harrison et al. 2007), although deviating from other 
studies, which did not find a significant impact (e.g., Reynaud and Couture 2012). Previous 
studies found a positive relationship between risk aversion and wealth (e.g., Cohen and 
Einav 2007), whereas others do not find a relationship (e.g., Tanaka et al. 2010). We found 
that a proxy for wealth such as the annual per capita household expenditure is positively 
associated with risk aversion. Moreover, some of the socio-demographic (age, gender, 
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household size, and dependency ratio) and socio-economic characteristics (total land 
owned, access to a savings account, and access to credit) are not significant, which is 
interesting because many studies found an effect (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990; Miyata 2003; 
Hallahan et al. 2004; Wik et al. 2004; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Jacobson and Petrie 2009; 
Nielsen et al. 2013). Although we found a significant effect of several socio-demographic 
and socio-economic factors on risk attitude, these factors are not consistent across the two 
elicitation methods. On this basis, we fail to reject H3 „Farmer-specific effects for risk 
attitude‟. 
Besides testing the effects of socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics on 
individuals‘ risk attitudes, we test for a potential ‗order effect‘ in the experiment to check 
whether farmers show different decision behavior when they are faced with the two 
lottery-choice experiments in a different order. Some participants were at first faced with 
the modified HLL and then with the modified BL or vice versa. According to Harrison et 
al. (2005b) prior experience with one task may influence participants‘ behavior in a 
subsequent task. However, it may also indicate a ‗learning effect‘, meaning that 
participants acquire routines in one task and apply them to later decisions even if they are 
related to another task (Scheufele and Bennett 2013). We also included a binary indicator 
for winning in the first lottery-choice experiment in order to test whether there is an impact 
on the second lottery-choice experiment. Order in the experiment is not statistically 
significant in the regression models. However, a participant who first played the modified 
BL and won is more risk averse in the subsequent modified HLL. This indicates that 
conducting various successive experiments should be done with caution as prior 
experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task, which was also found by 
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Table 7 Results of the interval and ordered probit regression with the individual risk attitude as the 
dependent variable (N = 332) 
Variable 
Interval regression Ordered probit regression 
Modified HLL Modified BL Modified HLL Modified BL 
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Order of experiment (1 = first 




























Observations 332 332 332 332 
Chi
2 23.43 19.18 24.04 16.12 
Log likelihood -698.0 -621.7 -616.5 -598.0 
Interval observations 290 169   
Right censored observations 14 122   
Left censored observations 19 41   
Uncensored observations 9 0   
Source: Survey data 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.   
Dependent variables: Interval regression: midpoint CRRA coefficients of the modified HL and BL; Ordered 
probit regression: number of safe choices in the modified HL and BL.  
a 




 At the time of the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately € 1 to UGX 3,000.  
c
 1 acre = 0.40 hectare.  
 
Chapter IV. Do Changing Probabilities or Payoffs in Lottery-Choice Experiments         86  





Smallholder farmers in a rural developing country setting face risky decisions regularly in 
their daily lives. Thus, a better understanding of farmers‘ risk attitudes is crucial in order to 
gain insight of how risk affects their decision behavior, interpreting agricultural outcomes, 
and designing policies and programs such as insurance instruments and other safety nets 
that effectively assist farmers. However, several studies quantifying individual risk 
attitudes showed that results of different elicitation methods may vary and reported 
relatively high inconsistency rates in individuals‘ response behavior, which may indicate a 
low level of comprehension. The comparison of different risk attitude elicitation methods 
allows insights into which method may be better adapted to assess risk attitudes of farmers 
in a developing country. In this study, we elicit the risk attitude of Ugandan smallholder 
farmers using two different methods based on the Holt and Laury (2002) and Brick et al. 
(2012) lottery tasks, which differ in the variation of probabilities and the fixing of payoffs 
or vice versa. Brick et al. (2012) assumed that people have more difficulties with varying 
probabilities than with varying amounts of payoffs. Furthermore, we evaluate the 
inconsistency rates in the response behavior and investigate whether risk attitudes are 
influenced by farmers‘ socio-demographic and socio-economic factors and whether these 
factors are consistent across the elicitation methods.   
Our results show first that farmers, on average, are risk averse. Second, the different 
categories of risk attitude indicate a statistically significant difference across the two 
elicitation methods. That means that risk attitude measures are affected by the type of 
method used, even though the tendency of participants being risk averse is the same. Third, 
we found a relatively low rate of inconsistent decisions in both lottery-choice experiments. 
This finding may be an indication that our version and implementation of the modified 
HLL and the modified BL was well understood by the participants and thus, an appropriate 
elicitation method within a developing country context. It also shows that in our case 
people do not have more difficulties with varying probabilities than with varying amounts 
of payoffs given the low inconsistency rates in both lottery-choice experiments. Fourth, 
specific socio-demographic and socio-economic factors are significant determinants of risk 
attitudes: education, district, and annual per capita household expenditure. The factor quiz 
test score, which we used assess whether farmers have a basic comprehension of 
probabilities, and the factor winner modified BL, which we used to assess whether winning 
in the first lottery-choice experiment influences the behavior in the second lottery-choice 
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experiment, also have an impact on individuals‘ risk attitudes. Although these factors are 
consistent across the two applied regression models, they are not consistent across the two 
different elicitation methods. This shows that one has to be cautious in making meaningful 
conclusions about the impact of these factors on risk attitude and therefore policy 
recommendations. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to take into account that our experimental 
design is abstracted from reality and is considerably simpler than risky situations that 
would occur in an actual setting. Participants may act differently in the experimental 
situation than they do in a similar situation in the real world. A common criticism of 
experiments has to do with whether experimental results are likely to provide reliable 
inferences outside the experimental setting and can be extrapolated to the real world 
(Levitt and List 2007; Roe and Just 2009). This lack of external validity is considered to be 
the major weakness of laboratory experiments (Loewenstein 1999). Nevertheless, we 
believe that a careful experimental design and implementation, which is adapted to a rural, 
developing country setting, is essential for a valid measure of individuals‘ risk attitudes.  
Some extensions of the present study might further verify the validity of our results. First, 
it would be interesting to analyze how the original lottery-choice experiment design with 
probabilities expressed in percent and the modified lottery-choice experiment design with 
probabilities expressed in bags of colored balls compares to each other in regard to 
inconsistency rates in the response behavior. Second, more research is needed in 
identifying more explanatory factors of risk attitudes and in examining the explanatory 
power of risk attitude measures in observed actual economic behavior. Third, different risk 
tasks involving different degrees of difficulty could be considered in order to more 
carefully address the question of how a participant‘s ability to reason with numbers and 
probabilities affects the results of different risk measures. Fourth, another interesting path 
to be taken would be to test whether farmers in developed countries show similar risk 
attitudes and inconsistency rates in the two lottery-choice experiments as farmers in 
developing countries. It would be also worth examining the robustness of our results by 
conducting the lottery-choice experiments with farmers in another developing country.  
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V. General Conclusions   
1 Conclusions   
1.1 Summary of findings  
Agricultural food supply systems are undergoing major structural changes, with modern 
supply chains, vertical integration and private standards gaining in importance. Although 
this transformation is partly driven by changing consumer preferences, it has profound 
implications on agricultural production systems in developing countries. Private standards, 
although voluntary, are becoming a requirement for smallholders to access high-value 
markets worldwide. Yet smallholder participation and the ability to comply with 
sustainability oriented certification standards may be affected by various factors that 
include climatic, institutional, and socio-economic conditions including individual 
preferences, in particular risk preferences.   
While there is consensus in the literature that domestic agricultural food systems in 
developing countries are profoundly affected by the growth of high-value markets, there is 
still an ongoing debate on the implications of modern supply chains on the welfare of 
smallholder farmers. On the one hand, farmers might be excluded from participation in 
modern supply chains, due to stringent food quality and safety standards. On the other 
hand, modern supply chains are increasingly viewed as a market based risk management 
mechanism in which smallholder farmers may benefit through higher prices, access to 
inputs, credits, extension and more consistent in terms output markets and prices. There is 
a growing body of literature analyzing the direct and indirect effects of different 
sustainability standards on the welfare of smallholder farmers in developing countries. 
Most of these studies show that poor rural households can benefit from modern supply 
chains through own participation as producers or through labor markets.  
In this study, we have contributed to existing literature in three broad ways. In Chapter II, 
we have analyzed and compared impacts of three sustainability oriented certification 
schemes – namely, Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic – on household living standards and 
poverty. We have used percapita household expenditure as the main variable of interest. 
We have contributed to extant literature by comparing income and poverty effects of 
different sustainability standards within the same context, while controlling for selection 
bias, using propensity score matching. We have shown that farmers complying with all 





three sustainability standards have significantly higher living standards. However, 
disaggregation by certification scheme shows that Fairtrade certification improves living 
standards by 30% and significantly reduces the likelihood of being poor by 50%. However, 
we have also shown that participation in UTZ and Organic certifications is not associated 
with higher living standards or lower poverty rates. Much of the observed differences can 
be explained by the fact that Fairtrade farmers receive minimum guaranteed prices. 
Furthermore, they have better bargaining power, and process their certified coffee. 
In Chapter III, we built on, and advanced the analysis from Chapter II, although the results 
are not disaggregated by certification standard. We have used 7 day recall data on 
household food consumption data covering over 100 different food types, which we 
converted into calories and micronutrients. We have analyzed the impact of sustainability 
oriented certification on household nutrition, while controlling observed and unobserved 
factors using an instrumental variable approach. In addition, we have used structural 
equation modeling to identify the main nutrition impact pathways. We have contributed to 
the existing literature in two ways. First, by using more comprehensive measures of 
nutrition — calories and three important micronutrients (iron, zinc and vitamin A) — as 
measures of undernutrition and dietary quality, respectively. Second, we contribute 
conceptually to the recent debate on linkages between agriculture, gender, and nutrition. 
We have shown that compliance with sustainability certification standards is associated 
with increased consumption of calories and micronutrients. We have also shown that 
participation in sustainability oriented certification leads to improved household nutrition, 
through increases in income and a loss in male control of income. Furthermore, these 
results are also valid, when considering the length of certification.  
In Chapter IV, we have compared the performance of two experimental methods in 
eliciting individual risk attitudes and how well they were understood by farmers. We have 
contributed to extant literature by comparing two innovative methods — based on the 
incentive-compatible lotteries used in Holt and Laury (2002) and Brick et al. (2012) — that 
can be used in eliciting individual risk attitudes. Furthermore, the two methods are 
modified from the original lottery-choice experiments by replacing probabilities expressed 
in percent with images of bags of colored balls to represent probabilities of different 
payoffs in order to apply them to individuals in a rural developing country setting. We 
have shown that both methods reveal high proportions of farmers who are classified as risk 





averse, which is consistent with literature on risk among smallholder farmers in developing 
countries.  
In the final analysis of the main findings, we can make some general conclusions. 
Although, we used two different econometric techniques in controlling for selection bias in 
Chapter II and Chapter III, our results consistently show that certification (as a dummy and 
not disaggregated by type) positively and significantly affects per-capita household 
income. In Chapter II, we did not find any significant association between sustainability 
oriented certification (in general) and the living standards and poverty levels of coffee 
farmers. However, in Chapter III we do find that farmers that comply with sustainability 
standards have better household nutrition. In Chapter IV, results of the elicitation methods 
both confirmed that smallholder coffee farmers in Uganda are generally risk averse.     
1.2 Policy implications 
There are some broader lessons that can be learned from our results. First, when provided 
with institutional support, smallholder farmers and cooperatives can participate in 
sustainability oriented certification schemes and be able to comply with stringent food 
quality and food safety standards. The cooperatives investigated in this study, although 
operating in one of the poorest countries in the world, have managed to fully comply with 
the different international standards for more than 5 years. This is an encouraging 
development and disproves pessimistic views that smallholder farmer will not be able to 
participate in high-value markets on a sustained basis.  
Second, the impact of standards and certification on farmer livelihoods may differ 
significantly by certification scheme, especially if they are income related. Hence, it is 
worthwhile to take a closer look. Better understanding impact differences and factors that 
contribute to these differences may be relevant for all actors along the supply chain, 
including consumers who may wish to make more informed purchase decisions.  
Third, the impacts of standards and certification systems depend to a large extent on 
institutional factors at the local level, including cooperative performance and management 
capacity. Certification may be a prerequisite for entering international high-value chains, 
but for farmers to take full advantage of that opportunity, they need institutional support 
from public, private, and non-governmental organizations in the form of credit, extension, 
access to inputs and opportunities to value add their commodities.  





Fourth, market interventions that integrate social components, which go beyond income 
benefits, as with the case of sustainability standards, have a role to play in improving intra-
household gender relations and resource allocation. Such components may be replicated 
and up-scaled, as best-practices, to other similar programs that have been associated with 
further marginalization of women. 
1.3 Limitations of the study 
The results of this manuscript add to the growing body of literature that assesses welfare 
implications for smallholder farmers complying with sustainability standards in the context 
of developing countries. While we find some welfare gains associated with sustainable 
standards, there are a number of other factors that limit the scope of our study.  
First, estimated welfare impacts results rely on cross-sectional data, which does not allow 
us to consider changes that occur over time. A useful extension of these findings would be 
following up on the same households over one or several rounds and building up a panel 
dataset. With panel data, it possible to analyze the evolution of welfare impacts between 
certified and non-certified farmers over time. Panel data will allow for the estimation of 
dynamic impacts, both income and non-income that can be used in assessing whether 
sustainability standards can be sustained over time. If they can, how do the different 
standards compare over time? Furthermore, panel data could provide a better 
understanding for policy makers and researchers alike on what happens to households that 
are certified and those that are non-certified over time. The following questions could be 
addressed and may be answered: Do certified households continue complying with 
stringent sustainability standards over time? If there is significant proportion of farmers 
that stop complying or decertified, what are the factors leading explaining non-
compliance? Do non-certified households remain supplying to traditional markets?   
In terms of nutrition impacts, our study relied on household consumption data from a 
single 7-day recall period, which cannot account for seasonal variation in food 
consumption. Although costly and time consuming, it may be useful to collect household 
consumption at different intervals of the year that capture variability in supply. Second, the 
methods we have used to examine the nutrition impacts do not provide insights on intra-
household food distribution. Collecting additional data consisting of child anthropometrics 
will be able to provide more in-depth analysis on intra-household undernutrition and 
dietary quality dynamics.  





With respect to the lottery-choice experiments, it would be interesting to conduct and 
compare the original lottery-choice experiment design with probabilities expressed in 
percent and the modified lottery-choice experiment design with probabilities expressed in 
bags of colored balls using the same sample of subjects, given the low inconsistency rates 
in the response behavior in the results,. An extension of the present study regarding 
different sample groups by testing whether farmers in developed countries show similar 
risk attitudes and inconsistency rates in the two lottery-choice experiments as farmers in 
developing countries or by conducting the lottery-choice experiments with farmers in 
another developing country might further verify the validity of the results. 
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Experimental instructions  
Outline 
The experiment session comprises:  
1 Sign-in (location and arrival)   
2 Introduction and agenda (an introduction of the experimenter, enumerators, 
assistant experimenter, and the project)  
3 Quiz  
4 Instructions, practice, and decision making (coin tossing games are randomized)  
4.1 Lottery game (1)  
4.2 Lottery game (2)             
5 Payment  
 
1 Sign-in (location and arrival) 
- Each participant will present his/her photo ID before he/she will be signed in. The 
participant will then draw a number out of a bag. This number (personal number of 
the respondent) randomly determines his/her seat, which is the individual‘s location 
throughout the experiment session.  
- The experiment will be conducted in sessions of six participants in classrooms in 
local schools or in a meeting room at the main gathering place of a farmer‘s group 
or association.  
- Each participant will have his/her own enumerator. 
- The typical layout of the room will be as follows:  
Front of room (experimenter, and white board) 
 
Seat 1 Seat 2 
Seat 3 Seat 4 
Seat 5 Seat 6 
 
Back of room (assistant experimenter/cashier) 
 






- Text in italics is not part of the participant instructions. 
- The instructions are explained orally by the experimenter in the local language. 
- Once all the participants are seated, the explanation will start. 
 
2 Introduction and agenda 
- Hello and welcome. Thank you for coming to our workshop today.  
- The experimenter introduces himself, the enumerators, and the assistant 
experimenter. The experimenter introduces the institution and the project, typically 
as follows: 
- In Uganda, we are conducting a research project on farmers‘ decision behavior 
in risky situations.  
- We have been holding discussions with farmers across many parts of Uganda. 
In particular, we have talked to farmers in …, but we have not been here before. 
- We are very grateful that we can do the workshop in this area today and that 
you have found some time to participate. Thank you very much for that. 
- For the upcoming tasks, you will receive cash payments for the decisions you 
make. We provide these payments for two purposes: 
i. Because you came here today and you are spending your time with us. 
This is time in which you could be doing something else, so we would 
like to remunerate this. 
ii. Also, we would like you to take this decision seriously, so that it 
represents your decision making behavior of normal real life decisions.  
- Today‘s workshop will include the following steps:  
- First, we explain the instructions of the different tasks on decision making.   
- Then, we will do a practice run together to show how it works. Then, you will 
make your decisions. Today, we will do several types of decisions. In a 
moment, I will explain all the different tasks on decision making in more detail, 
one after another.  
- Then, you will receive your payment. Payment will be effected in private and in 
cash at the end of today‘s workshop.  
- I have some additional general comments:  
- Please turn off your mobile phones, etc.  





- All decisions you make or answers you give during the workshop are private, 
confidential, and anonymous. 
- Since all decisions and answers are private, please do not talk to each other 
anymore. If you have questions, please ask us by raising your hand. 
- Please do not discuss with your neighbor except for the enumerator next to you. 
The enumerator next to you will record your answers.  
- When making decisions, you should make the decision that you prefer the most 
as you will receive the cash payment on the basis of that decision, given that 
you have been selected as a winner. Please make your decisions as if they are 
real life decisions. 
-  If there are any questions at any point, please raise your hand and ask.  
- Any questions before we start?  
 
3 Quiz 
- The experimenter hands out the questionnaire to the enumerator. Then, explanation 
and decision making would start. 
- We will start today‘s workshop with a short quiz.  
- The quiz contains several tasks. It is not a test; you do not need to worry if the 
questions seem difficult.  
- Questions are asked with regard to probabilities and percentage calculation. This 
basically enables the participants to start thinking about the material and the 
decisions they will be presented with during the workshop. The participants make 
their choice, and their enumerators record the answers and tick the relevant box. 
- Now, we are coming to the first task.  
- 1. Imagine, we toss a coin and the ‗heads‘ (emblem) comes up. What comes up if 
we toss the coin again? (possible answers: a = heads, b = tails, c = one cannot 
predict exactly)  
- Now, we are coming to the second task.  
- 2. If the chance of winning a prize is 10%, how many people out of 100 would be 
expected to get the prize? If you don‘t know, put an X.  
- Now, we are coming to the last task of this quiz.  
- 3. When you draw the red ball, you win! Look at the two boxes and mark the 
correct sentence. (Possible answers: a = my chance to win is higher if I choose Box 





A. b = my chance to win is equal, it does not matter which box I choose. c = my 




4 Instructions and decision making 
4.1 Lottery game (1)  
- In the first/second session, you are asked to choose between two bags. You will be 
asked to make a number of repeated choices.  
- I will now explain the first session. Then, you will make your decisions in this 
session. 
- Posters are displayed on a large white board at the front of the room. This is used 
to illustrate the basics of the game as explained below. 
- The objective of this task is to win money. There are four possible prizes: 300 
UGX, 4,800 UGX, 6,000 UGX, and 11,550 UGX. The four different colored balls 
represent the four possible prizes. The green ball is worth 300 UGX, the blue ball is 
worth 4,800 UGX, the red ball is worth 6,000 UGX, and the yellow ball is 
worth 11,550 UGX.  
- Note that we will randomly select one winner out of you for this task.  
- Show poster 1: The picture of the sheet with the lottery game  
- Real balls will also be shown.  
Choose your preferred bag by marking either Bag A or B in each row. 
 
 
1 My chance to win is higher if I choose Box A.
2 My chance to win is equal, it does not matter which box I choose.
3 My chanc  to win is higher if I choose Box B.
Box BBox A
When you draw the red ball, you win! Look at the 2 boxes and mark the correct 
sentence.





                                                              
 
                                                   […]                                     […] 
 
 
- How are you going to win these prizes? 
- To win these prizes, you will first have to choose between two bags, Bag A and 
Bag B, for each of the 10 rows. How do these two bags differ? Each bag contains 
10 balls. The two bags contain differently colored balls (green, blue, red, and 
yellow) with a different value. We draw only one ball from the selected bag, which 
will be the prize. If you choose Bag A, you can win a prize of 6,000 UGX (red ball) 
or a prize of 4,800 UGX (blue ball). And if you choose Bag B, you can win a prize 
of 11,550 UGX (yellow ball) or a prize of 300 UGX (green ball). We are going to 
ask you which of these two bags you prefer.  
- Note that with Bag A the difference between the prizes is small, while it is large in 
the case of Bag B. 
- In addition, in Bag A the prize of 6,000 UGX is smaller than the prize of 11,550 
UGX in Bag B, and the prize of 4,800 UGX in Bag A is greater than the prize of 
300 UGX in Bag B. 
- Thus, you will choose between Bag A and Bag B in 10 rows, one after another.  
- Let‘s focus on the first row.  
























- Bag A: 
- Bag A contains nine blue balls and one red ball. Each blue ball is worth 4,800 
UGX, and the red ball is worth 6,000 UGX.  
- If this bag is selected and the red ball is subsequently drawn, you will win 6,000 
UGX. In the case that one of the blue balls is drawn, you will win 4,800 UGX. 
- So, if we pick a ball from the bag, it may be blue or red. But, it is more likely 
that we pick one of the blue balls because there are more blue balls (than red 
balls) in the bag. 
- Bag B:  
- Now, let‘s look at Bag B. What is different about it? Well, this bag contains 
nine green balls and one yellow ball. Each green ball is worth 300 UGX, and 
the yellow ball is worth 11,550 UGX.  
- If this bag is selected and the yellow ball is subsequently drawn, you will win 
11,550 UGX. In the case that one of the green balls is drawn, you will win 300 
UGX. 
- So, if we pick a ball from the bag, it may be a green or a yellow one. But, it is 
more likely that we pick one of the green balls because there are more green 
balls (than yellow balls) in the bag. 
- This explains row one. How do the other rows differ from row one?  
- Show poster 3: example for Bag A or Bag B in row two 
A B
Bag A Bag B
Choice
1






- Note that when we go from row one to row two, the only aspect that changes is the 
number of red balls in the bags. That is, the value of the balls does NOT change.  
- Bag A:  
- Bag A contains eight blue balls and two red balls. Each blue ball is 
worth 4,800 UGX and each red ball is worth 6,000 UGX.  
- If this bag is selected and the red ball is subsequently drawn, you will win 6,000 
UGX. In the case that one of the blue balls is drawn, you will win 4,800 UGX. 
- So, if we pick a ball from the bag, it may be blue or red. But it is more likely 
that one of the blue balls is drawn because there are more blue balls (than red 
balls) in the bag. 
- Bag B:  
- Bag B contains eight green balls (each worth 300 UGX) and two yellow balls 
(each worth 11,550 UGX). Each green ball is worth 300 UGX, and each yellow 
ball is worth 11,550 UGX. 
- If this bag is selected and the yellow ball is subsequently drawn, you will win 
11,550 UGX. In the case that one of the green balls is drawn, you will win 300 
UGX. 
- So, if we pick a ball from the bag, it may be green or yellow. But, it is more 
likely that one of the green balls is drawn because there are more green balls 
(than yellow balls) in the bag. 
- Quiz participants for understanding (control questions):  
- Now, what happens if we go from row two to row three?  
- Show poster 4: example for Bag A or Bag B in row three 
A B










- How many blue and red balls does Bag A contain?  
- How many green and yellow balls does Bag B contain? 
- Suppose you choose Bag A and the red ball is drawn, how much do you win? 
- Suppose you choose Bag B and the yellow ball is drawn, how much is it worth? 
- etc. 
- So, we are going to ask you to decide for bag A or B in each of the 10 rows.  
- Note that your choice should really be guided by your attitudes. There are no wrong 
or right decisions.   
- Then, participants are informed that only one row will be selected for payment and 
that only one person wins the prize.  
- How will we determine the amount of money you will win for participating in this 
task? Now, we will explain the payment for this game.  
- Only one person will receive a payment for one of the choices he/she made in this 
task. However, you do not know yet for which of the choices the selected person 
will receive the payment, so you will want to think about each choice very 
carefully. You will only find out at the end of this task for which of these choices 
the selected person is going to receive a payment. 
- The payment in this game comprises three draws: 
- The first draw is to determine the person who wins a prize. Remember, in the 
beginning of today‘s workshop, you got a personal number. We will ask one of 
A B
3









you to draw a number between 1 and 6 out of a bag. The holder of the number 
that is picked from the bag will be the winner of one of the prizes.   
- The second draw is to determine the row for which you will get paid. We will 
ask the selected person to draw a number between one and 10 out of a bag. The 
number that is picked from the bag will be the choice that counts for the 
selected person.  
- The third draw is to determine whether the person receives the low or high 
prize. We will ask the selected person to draw a ball out of Bag A in case he/she 
chose Bag A or one out of Bag B in case he/she chose Bag B. The ball that is 
picked from the respective bag will be the choice that counts for him/her.  
- Are there any questions before we start? 
- Then, decisions will be made.  
- Which bag do you choose? Choose your preferred bag by marking either Bag A or 
B in each row. 
- The enumerators ask their farmers for each of the 10 rows which bag they prefer. 
The participants make their choice by pointing at the bag they prefer, and their 
enumerators record the answers and tick the relevant box. 
 
4.2 Lottery game (2)  
- In the first/second session, you are asked to choose between two bags. You will be 
asked to make a number of repeated choices.  
- I will now explain the second/third session. Then, you will make your decisions in 
this session. 
- Posters are displayed on a large white board at the front of the room. This is used 
to illustrate the basics of the game as explained below. 
- The objective of this task is to win money. The differently coloured balls represent 
the possible prizes. The red ball is worth 0 UGX, the blue ball is worth 10,000 
UGX, and the value of the green ball ranges from 10,000 UGX to 1,000 UGX.  
- Note that we will randomly select one winner for this task.  
- Show poster 1: The picture of the sheet with the lottery game 
- Real balls will also be shown. 
Choose your preferred bag by marking either Bag A or B in each row. 








                                              […]                                 […] 
 
- How are you going to win these prizes? 
- To win these prizes, you will first have to choose between two bags, Bag A and 
Bag B, for each of the 10 rows. How do these two bags differ? The two bags 
contain differently coloured balls (green, blue, and red). The value of the green ball 
changes in each decision row, while the values of the blue and the red ball remain 
the same across the decision rows. We draw only one ball of the selected bag, 
which will be the prize.   
- If you choose Bag A, you can win for sure a certain amount of money (green ball). 
If you choose Bag B, you can win a prize of 10,000 UGX (blue ball) or nothing 
(red ball). We are going to ask you which of these two bags you prefer.  
- The questions deal with the question of whether you prefer to have a guaranteed 
smaller amount of money, OR a larger amount of money that involves some risk 
and you might end up getting nothing. You can never lose any money irrespective 
of what you choose. 























- Let‘s focus on the first row.  
- Show poster 2: example for Bag A or Bag B in row one 
 
- Bag A: 
- Bag A contains one green ball. This ball is worth 10,000 UGX. 
- If this bag is selected and the green ball is subsequently drawn, you will 
win 10,000 UGX.  
- So, if you choose bag A, you know what you get for sure.  
- Bag B:  
- Now, let‘s look at Bag B. What is different about it? Well, this bag contains one 
blue ball and one red ball. The blue ball is worth 10,000 UGX and the red is 
worth nothing.  
- If this bag is selected and the blue ball is subsequently drawn, you will 
win 10,000 UGX. There is also the chance that the red ball is drawn. In this 
case, you will get nothing.  
- This explains row one. How do the other rows differ from row one?  
- Show poster 3: example for Bag A or Bag B in row two 
 
 
- Note that when we go from row one to row two, the only aspect that changes is the 

















- Bag A: 
- Bag A contains one green ball. Now, this ball is worth 7,500 UGX. 
- If this bag is selected and the green ball is subsequently drawn, you will 
win 7,500 UGX.  
- So, if you choose bag A, you know what you get for sure.  
- Bag B:  
- Now, let‘s look at Bag B. This bag contains one blue ball and one red ball like 
in the first example. The blue ball is worth 10,000 UGX and the red is worth 
nothing.  
- If this bag is selected and the blue ball is subsequently drawn, you will 
win 10,000 UGX. There is also the chance that the red ball is drawn. In this 
case, you will get nothing.  
- Quiz participants for understanding. Control questions are asked with regard to the 
probabilities and earnings.  
- Now, what happens if we go from row two to row three?  
- Show poster 4: example for Bag A or Bag B in row three 
 
- How many balls does bag A contain?  
- What is the value of the green ball?  













- Suppose you choose Bag A and the green ball is drawn, how much do you win? 
- Suppose you choose Bag B and the red ball is drawn, how much do you win? 
- etc. 
- So, we are going to ask you to make a decision for each of the eight rows: Bag A or 
Bag B.  
- Note that your choice should really be guided by your attitudes. There are no wrong 
or right decisions.   
- Then, participants are informed that only one row would be selected for payment 
and that only one person wins the prize.  
- How will we determine the amount of money you will win for participating in this 
task? Now, we will explain the payment for this task.  
- Only one person will receive a payment for one of the choices he/she made in this 
task. However, you do not know yet for which of the choices the selected person 
will receive the payment, so you will want to think about each choice very 
carefully. You will only find out at the end of this task for which of these choices 
the selected person is going to receive a payment.  
- The payment in this game comprises three draws: 
- The first draw is to determine the person who wins a prize. Remember, in the 
beginning of today‘s workshop, you got a personal number. We will ask one of 
you to draw a number between one and six out of a bag. The number that is 
picked from the bag will determine the winner of one of the prizes.   
- The second draw is to determine the row for which you will get paid. We will 
ask the selected person to draw a number between one and eight out of a bag. 
The number that is picked from the bag will be the choice that counts for 
him/her.  
- If the person chose bag A, which means he/she decided to take the money for 
sure, he/she will get that amount of money. If the person chose bag B, he/she 
will draw a ball out of the bag to determine whether he/she receives 10,000 
UGX or nothing. The ball that is picked from the respective bag will be the 
choice that counts for the selected person.  
- Are there any questions before we start? 
- Then, decisions will be made.  
- Which bag do you choose? Choose your preferred bag by marking either Bag A or 
B in each row. 





- The enumerators ask their participants for each of the eight rows which bag they 
prefer. The participants make their choice by pointing to the bag they prefer, and 

























































































1 District: 7 Questionnaire Number 
2 County: 8 Enumerator:
3 Subcounty: 9 Date of interview 
4 Parish: 10 Name of Household Head
5 Village: 11 Time interview                     Started____________ Ended______________
5.5 Local Council LC1 _________________________________
GPS COORDINATES AT THE RESIDENCY OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD
11 North (N)/South(S) N         S
12 Altitude meters
13 EAST E_________     ___________________________
15 Name of respondent: 16 Phone number of respondent__________________________________________
17 Is the respondent the HHD? 0. No 1. Yes 18 Gender of respondent 1. Male 2 Female
19 Where is the HHD? 1. Temporarily away 2. Absent from home at least 6 months in a year
20 Sampling 
 research to assess farmers' access and participation in premium certified markets for Coffee in Uganda. Your help in answering these questions is very much  appreciated.
 The survey should take about 2 hours. Your participation is completely voluntary and your responses will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL!''
Georg-August University Göttingen, Germany
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development
  Participation in Premium Certified Markets: Small Coffee farmers in Uganda
Household Survey Questionnaire 
“We are part of a team from University of Goettingen and working with local organizations like Agro-Eco, NUCAFE and Hanns Nuemann Stiftung and we are conducting  this
                 .                              ⁰
            .                              ⁰
                 /                / 2012      
1. Fmr Group + Certified                                                         2. Fmr group but NOT Certified                                                                              3. Control Group
122
HHID________
1. Provide the total area owned in both the last 12 months and 5 years ago? 2. Is the household certifed to grow coffee?     0 = No       1= Yes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Total land 1
2 Land rented-in 2
3 Land rented-out 3
4 Total area cultivated 4
5 Area under Pasture 5
6 Fallowed land Total area 
7 Area under coffee c
Certification:   1 = Organic-Utz      2= Fairtrade-Utz     3= Utz         4 = Fairtrade     88= Other 
7. Please provide the following details on ALL crops grown by the household in the last 12 months?
Be sure to capture details for all the crops that are grown in the dMain season and eFly season. In case crops are intercropped, please indicate.  
Also make sure to separate quantities harvested and sold  in two forms (as green and as dry) 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Quantity (kgs) Average Price/kg
Production 
acivities 
Retained harvest Revenue from sold output
List of possible 
crops
1 Coffee 1. Coffee                 16. Swt bananas
2 2. Matooke 17. Sukuma
3 3. Pineapples 18. Sugarcane 
4 4. Maize 19. Soyabeans
5 5. Beans 20. Pumpkins
6 6. Swt potatoes 21. Passion fruits 
7 7. Swt bananas 22.Cabbages 
8 8. Irish potatoes 23. Leafy vegetables
9 9. Groundnuts 
10 10. Cowpeas
11 11. Tomatoes 
12 12. Rice








For Masaka district =>dMain season was June-July 2011 and eFly season was Dec 2011-Jan 2012  fDecision maker:          1) = H-Head      2) = Spouse      3) Jointly    88) = Other  














Section A1: Area and General crops grown 
Crops Grown (please 
list all crops in the past 
12 months)











type of title do you 
hold for this land 
a
Title                            1= Freehold        2= Leasehold      3= Mailo         4= Customary rights               5= Bibanja    
b
Acquisation              1= Purchased    2= Inherited (family)   3= Inherited (spouse)  4= Agreement with land/use rights owner 
5= Without agreement with land/use rights owner
Area certfied  
Area in past 5 years 
(Acres)
Quantity sold and Price/kg Who makes or 
f
controls decisions on 
3. If Yes to Q2 c
Certification type 
Are you 1. fully 
certified  or 2. In-
transition






1. For each crop in previous table, provide details on the costs of production for the area indicated in previous table in the past 12 months.
Please maintain the same order as in previous table. Farmer should answer this table in reference to the area specified.
Also be sure to capture all costs for crops that are grown in two seasons/year. 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Hired labor 
Quantity (kgs) Cost (Shs/Kg) Quantity (kgs) Cost (Shs/Kg) Quantity (kgs) Cost (Shs/Kg) Quantity (kgs/ltrs) Cost (Shs/unit) Cost (Shs)
1 Coffee
2
1. Coffee                 16. Sukuma
3
2. Matooke 17. Sugarcane 
4
3. Pineapples 18. Soyabeans
5






6. Swt. potatoes 21.Cabbages 
8























Also includes costs of herbicides, fungicides
b
If the farmer owns machinery ask for the cost of operation (e.g. Fuel, hiring, maintanance). We are only interested in the variable costs
c
Other additional costs incurred by the farmer e.g. packaging 
For Masaka district =>dMain season was June-July 2011 and eFly season was Dec 2011-Jan 2012  For Luwero district =>dMain season was in Dec 2011-March 2012 and eFly was in Aug-Oct 2011   
2. On average, how much time (in mins) do you spend walking from your homestead to the NEAREST field?_______________mins














List of possible crops

















1. How long have you been growing coffee?  __________________________years.
2. Provide information on your coffee production in the last 12 months.
 ENUMERATOR: Start with Coffee Gardens that are certified, consistent with column 6






















Flowers Coffee sold in the field as flowers (also include Green berries)
a
Red Cherries: Wet coffee still in husks sold soon after harvesting For Masaka district =>
dMain season was June-July 2011 and eFly season was Dec 2011-Jan 2012  
b
Kiboko (Dry Cherries): beans sun-dried for (1-2 weeks).
c
FAQ (Fair Average Quality): Dry, hulled green beans but not graded For Luwero district =>
dMain season was in Dec 2011-March 2012 and eFly was in Aug-Oct 2011   
3. What is the Average Age of your current coffee trees (years) Productive trees: ____________________years
Unproductive trees: ____________________years
1=Robusta-original            
2=Robusta-clonal            
3= Arabica             
4= A-Lite            
88=Other________
1 = Org/Utz            
2 = Fairtrade/Utz               
3 = Utz                  



















Quantity of coffee sold (Kgs) Coffee price received by farmer 
B1: Coffee Production and marketing
Type of 
certification 
Which varieties did 
you grow?















Quantity of Red 
cherries 









































































1. For all the coffee produced, provide details of the cost of production in the past 12 months.
Maintain the same order of coffee list as in the previous table.   
Make it clear to respondent that all costs are in reference to the area specified in the previous table.
45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 
Hired labor 






















If the farmer owns machinery ask for the costs of operation (e.g. Fuel, hiring, maintanance)
b
Other additional costs incurred by the farmer e.g. packaging 
For Masaka district =>
dMain season was June-July 2011 and eFly season was Dec 2011-Jan 2012  For Luwero district =>dMain season was in Dec 2011-March 2012 and eFly was in Aug-Oct 2011   
Section B2 Coffee Production Costs 














































































1. For all the CERTIFIED COFFEE you produce, specify how often the following operations were carried in the past 12 months. 
 ENUMERATOR: *WORKERS BELOW 14 YEARS OF AGE ARE CONSIDERED AS CHILDREN
55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 
Male Female *Child Male Female *Child
# of days b # of days b # of days b # of days b # of days b # of days b
1 Weeding Codes: 
2 Harvesting 1= Land-prep
3 Pruning 2= Planting 
4 Fertilizing 3= Gap filling





8 Weeding 7 = Transporting 
9 Harvesting 8= Selling 












































Number of times activity (...) is carried in the past 12 months for CERTIFIED coffee
b
Aggregate the number of labor days spent each time in column
c
Specify the typical number of hours spent each day in column



























































Acitivity aNumber of times 
b
Total labor days for 
each activity
c
No. of hours per day
 127
HHID________
1. For all the NON-CERTIFIED COFFEE you produce, specify how often the following operations were carried in the past 12 months. 
 ENUMERATOR: *WORKERS BELOW 14 YEARS OF AGE ARE CONSIDERED AS CHILDREN
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 













1 Weeding Codes: 
2 Harvesting 1= Land-prep
3 Pruning 2= Planting 
4 Fertilizing 3= Gap filling





8 Weeding 7 = Transporting 
9 Harvesting 8= Selling 












































Number of times activity (...) is carried in the past 12 months for CERTIFIED coffee
b
Aggregate the number of labor days spent each time in column
c
Specify the typical number of hours spent each day in column
For Masaka district =>dMain season was June-July 2011 and eFly season was Dec 2011-Jan 2012  For Luwero district =>dMain season was in Dec 2011-March 2012 and eFly was in Aug-Oct 2011   
What is the typical number of hours spent on a day working by   Men_________hrs/day Women_________hrs/day Children_________hrs/day


























































Acitivity aNumber of times 
b
Total labor days for 
each activity
c
No. of hours per day
 128
HHID________
1. Provide answers to the following questions
 ENUMERATOR: Specify the type of certified coffee being reffered to in columns 
79 80 81 82 83 
1= Organic 2= Fairtrade 3= Utz
0= none
1= Coffee wilt disease
3= Coffee blight   88= Other 
If Yes, up to what moisture content to 
you Dry your coffee?
9
0= None        1= Coffee borer 
2= Weavil    88=Other 
13
How do you store your coffee after 
harvesting? 
1=  on ground      2= off the ground     
88= Other
10
How do you ascertain the mositure 
content? 
1 = Self         2 = Other farmers     3= Co-op     
4=Exporter     5=Gvt      88= Other 
2
If Yes to Q1, how were you informed of 
these certified markets?
Certification: 1= Organic    2= FT     3= Utz   4=Rainforest Alliance     88= Other 
0= don’t dry       1=  on bare ground           




1 = CO-OP      2 = Farmer Group
What are your main sources for coffee 
seedlings/cuttings?
7 How do you dry your coffee? 
6
Are you aware of certification 
schemes  like Organic, FT or Utz?  
0 = No          1 = Yes 
Indicate which ones 
3 = Neighbor    4 = Media      88.Other__
Section B4. Coffee Marketing and Certification
 1=  moisture metre           2= biting       
3=hand shaking       4= No of days in 
Sun        88= Other
8
Do you dry it to a certain moisture 
content?
11







3= Utz    4= Rainforest   88= Other 
12
What are the main pests affecting your 
coffee
0 = None          1 = Organic     2= FT 
 For each certification scheme, indicate 
main challenges of getting certfied?
0= Don' know     1 = High costs     
2=Stringent requirements     88 = Other
If given the chance, which certification 
scheme would you have first preference 
to participate in?
Responses (Allow for multiple 
answers)
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1. Provide answers to the following questions
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 aCodes for Who Buys
1= Farmer group








2 What are some of the Advantages and Disadvantages of selling your coffee to the following Buyers?
0= None 0= None
1= Get cash immediately 1= Delayed payment
2= Higher prices 2= Lower prices
3= Advance payments 3= No Advance payments
4= Get Inputs on credit 4= No Inputs on credit
5= Value addition 5= No Value addition
6= Low transport costs 6= High transport costs
7= Able to get cash on credit 7= Not able to get cash on credit
8= Buyer trustworthy 8= Buyer untrustworthy
88= Other 88= Other
1. Head      2. spouse    3. Jointly    88. Other__________ 1. Head      2. spouse    3. Jointly    88. Other__________4
Who in the household negotiates for 





whom do you normally sell the 
following  type of coffee? (allow multiple 
respones BUT start with most important)?
3
What are some of the 
b
reasons you sell 
this type of coffee (Start with the most 
important)?
1
What proportion (%) of your coffee do you 
normally  sell as (…)?
What are some of the Advantages of 
selling your coffee to the following?
Section B5. Coffee Marketing and Certification
92 
IBERO pvt ltd




7 Directly to roasters (e.g. Sukufina)
6 Private buyers/m-men/brokers
















Section B6. Coffee Marketing and Certification 
1. FOR ALL FARMERS: Provide answers to the following questions
94 95 96 97 98 99 
1.                      
Organic+Utz 
2.                   
Utz
3.         
Fairtrade






   3= increased
2 Coffee area 
1= decreased     2= no change 
1 Coffee yield
1= decreased     2= no change 
9
When you started supplying (...) coffee, 
How did the following aspects 
change?
8
Area for other crops e.g banana
   3= improved
4
   3= increased
3 Quality of coffee
1= decreased     2= no change 
   3= increased
1= decreased     2= no change 
   3= increased
0= Don't use            1= decreased         
   2= no change      3= increased
5  Prices of coffee 




Do you Keep Records for your coffee 
production and activities?
0= No        1= Yes   
Do you Prune your coffee?
0= No        1= Yes   
   2= no change      3= increased
0= Don't use            1= decreased         Area under Shed Coffee indicate 
proportion (%) for each type of coffee
17
0= Don't use            1= decreased         
14
0= Don't use            1= decreased         
16
CERTIFIED Coffee NON-CERTIFIED coffee 
0= Don't use            1= decreased         





1= decreased     2= no change 
   3= increased
1= decreased     2= no change 
 Household demand for hired labor
Household demand for family labor
   3= increased
Access to Output Markets for Coffee  
Use of fertilizers
Agronomic Practices  and Management 
Gender equality (roles, responsibility 
and decision making)
1=worsened    2= no change 
Household disposable income
1= decreased     2= no change 
   3= increased
13
Do you Intecrop or use Crop Cover on 
your coffee fields?
0= No        1= Yes   
12
   2= no change      3= increased
Use of 
pesticides/fungicides/herbicides
Use of mulching indicate proportion (%) 
for each type of coffee
Use of Contour Ridges or trenches to 
avoid erosion
   2= no change      3= increased
   2= no change      3= increased
Use of Minimum/Zero tillage  indicate 
proportion (%) for each type of coffee
0= Don't use            1= decreased         
   2= no change      3= increased
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HHID________
1. Provide the following information on livestock owned by your household in the past 12 months.
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 
Fodder Hired Labor Veterinary Other costs
1 Cows local
2 Bulls/oxen local 
3 Calves local


















19 Hides & Skin
88 Other products
*Value of all livestock and livestock products sold by the household in the past 12 months.
Total Cost of Production (Shs)Did you sell this 
(..) in the last 12 
months          0=No   
1=Yes
If Yes, what was 
the *Total Value 




Section C. Livestock production 
Livestock Number currently 
owned
Estimate the value 
if sold (Shs) 
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HHID________
1.Provide the following information on assets owned in the past 12 months?
109 110 111 112 
Units currently owned (or pairs) Estimated value (Shs) Buyer* Did household **OWN this asset 5 years ago?
1 Animal plough
2 Animal harrow
3 Animal scotch cart
4 Wheel barrow 
5 Knapsack sprayer
6 Tractor
















1.HH head                      
2.Spouse                    
3.Jointly                             88. 
Other
**0= No     1= Yes    
Household assets 





1. Number of years of residence in this community?                                                                                        YRES____________________________years.
2. In which district where you resident before settling in this community?                                           DRES ___________________________
3. How long have you been involved in farming?                                                                                               YFARM__________________________years.





Current ownership Ownership in the last 5 years
1 = Bush                                             2 = Flush                  3= Ventilated latrine         
5 = Paraffin/Kerosine       6= Solar           7=Biogas      88= other 
1= Charcoal      2= Firewood       3= Gas       4=  Electricity        
1= Electric bulbs         2= Parrafin lantern          3= Candles      
4= Wick Lamp                                            88= other 
1 = Private tap              2 = Public Tap/Borehole    
        4= River, stream, lake, pond, well, springs       5= Rain water       88= Other 
4=  Pit Latrine                                                                         88 = Other
1 = Own with title deeds       2 = Own without  title deeds
3 = Rented    4 = Borrowed without pay      88.Other_
1= mud hut with grass thatching      2= Mud hut with asbestors/iron roof
3= Brick house with grass thatching    4= Brick house with asbestors/iron roof
7
Section D. Household Assets II
Tenure status of dwelling
Main type of cooking fuel 
3 Total number of rooms owned 
6 Main source of lighting
5
Type of toilet 
1 Type of dwelling 




Section E: Household Information 
1. First, I would like to know the number of people who normally live and eat their meals in this household (including servants and other workers).  
 N/B Tenants who pay rent are NOT considered as members of this household.                           Number of HH members ___________________
2. Please provide the list of names of each member in this household starting with the Head, Spouse , his/her children in order of age. 





Relationship to the 
HHD?
Marital status
Number of  years 
spent in formal 
education (years)
What is your 
religion 
Main occupation 
Did member get any 
formal training? 
Does the member 
own a cellphone?
Does member 





















0 = No                            
1 = Yes                       
1=Male          
2=Female
1 = Head                           
2 = Spouse                        
3 = Son/daughter                   
4 = Son/daughter-in-law                    
5 = Father/mother             
6 = Sister/brother                  
7 = Niece/nephew                
8 = Grandchild                   
9 = Servant/worker         
88 = other, specify
1=  Single                                       
2 = Married                      
3 = Separated                                  
4 = Divorced              
0= None                   
1= Catholic            
2= Islam             
3= Protestant        
4=Traditional         
5= Adventists       
6= Pentecoastal   
88=Others 
0 = Unemployed                    
1 = Farmer                    
2 = Wage earner                                     
3 = Self-employed             
4 = Salaried wkr                
5  = Pensioned             
6 = Student                                      
8 = Boda Boda 
88=other
0 = No                            
1 = Yes                       
PID
0= None                     
1= Good agric 
practices                  2= 
Coffee husbandry               
3=Gender equality     
4= Animal husbandry                
5 = Business mgt      




1. Provide information on how much Off-farm income was earned by members of this household in the past 12 months. 
PLEASE ENSURE INFORMATION IN THIS TABLE CORRESPONDS TO PREVIOUS TABLE AND COLUMN 88 in particular.
127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 
H-Head Member ____ Member ____ Member ____ Member ____ Member ____ Member ____ Member ____ Member ____ Member ____ Member ____
1 Agricultural Wage labour  from other 
farms            
2 Wage employment outside Agriculture 
3 Profit from personal business (incl. 
retail trade, Boda boda, brickmaking)
4 Revenue from sale of forest products 
(tree poles, firewood, charcoal)  
5 Wage from machinery service for other 
farms                       
6 Remittances received from family 
members and relatives       
7 Pensions/retirement package/share 
dividends                    
8 Revenue from leasing out land              
9 Income from renting out draft animals or 
machinery to other farms                       
10 Sale of household Assets (land, 
furniture)
11 Total             
 Income obtained by household members during the last 12 months (Shs/year)




1. On average, how many people were present in the last 7 days? In this section children are defined as less than 18 years.
138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 
Male Female Male Female Female Male Female
1
147 148 149 150 151 152 153 
Unit codes
1 Matoke 36 Green/Red Pepper
1= Kilogram
2 Banana (Kivuvu) 37 Cucumber
2= Gram
3 Plantain (Gonja) 38 Spinach
3= Liter
4 Maize green 39 Bitter leaf (jobyo)
4 =Millilitres 
(ml)
5 Maize grain 40 Okra (Bamia)
5 =5kg bag
6 Maize flour 41 Pumpkin
6 =25kg bag
7 Sweet potato (fresh) 42 Peas
7 =50kg bag
8 Sweet potato dry 43 Sukuma (L.V)
8 =70kg bag
9 Irish potato 44 Nakati (L.V)
9 =90kg bag
10 Sorghum 45 Red chillies 
10 =100kg bag
11 Millet 46 Sour tomatoes
11 = 120kg bag




14 Chapati 47 Beef
14=Bunch
15 Cowpea 48 Pork
15=Piece/numbe
r
16 Ground nuts (fresh) 49 Chicken
16= Heap
17 Ground nuts (dry) 50 Goat
17 =Handful
18 Soybean flour 51 Fish (fresh)
18 = Bundle
19 Cassava (fresh) 52 Fish (dry)
19 = Clusters








22 Beans (fresh) 55 Turkey
22 =1 kg tin
23 Yam flour 56 Ducks
23 = Debe
24 Yam fresh 57 Mutton
24 =Bowl
25 Melon 58 Grass hoppers
25 =Cup
26 Bread 59 White ants 
26 =Glass
27 Infant formulae foods 888 Others
27= Basin
28 sim sim 
28 = Trays
88 Other staples 60 Milk
88 = others 
(specify)
61 Cheese
30 Cabbage 62 Ghee
31 Tomato 63 Ice cream
32 Onion 64 Yoghurt





Section G: Food Expenditure I
2. In the past 7 days indicate how much of the following food items your household consumed and the value in Shs. (This is for all food consumed, including own-produced, bought, gifts and from food aid programme, by all people living in household)
Staple foods Vegetables II
Qty in kg or other units    Total Value in Shs






Adults Children Adults 
Male 
Household members Visiting members
Dairy products
Qty in kg or other units    
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HHID________
154 155 156 157 158 159 159 160 
*Unit codes
55 Sweett bananas 79 Royco
1= Kilogram
56 Bogoya 80 Salt
2= Gram
57 Pineapples 81 Curry
3= Liter
58 Pawpaws 82 Oatmeal
4 =Millilitres
59 Mangoes 83 Ginger
5 =5kg bag
60 Apples 84 Other spices
6 =25kg bag
61 Passion fruits 85 Sugar and sweets
7 =50kg bag
62 Guavas 86 Sugar
8 =70kg bag
63 Sugar cane 87 Chocolate
9 =90kg bag
64 Oranges 88 Other sweets
10 =100kg bag
65 Jack Fruit 89 Cooking oil/fat
11 = 120kg bag
888 Other fruits 90 Peanut butter oil
12=Table 
spoon
91 Sheer butter oil
13= Tea spoon
64 Coffee 92 Margarine/Butter
14=Bunch
65 Tea 93 Ghee
15=Piece/numb
er
66 Soft drinks 94 Other oil
16= heap
67 Fruit juices 95 Snacks
17 =Handful
68 Carbonated Drinks 96 Popcorn
18=Pakaacha
69 Other juice 97 Biscuit
19 = Gorogoro








72 Wine 100 Cashew nut
22 =1 kg tin








888 Other beverages 
88 = others 
(specify)
Section G: Food Expenditure II





Qty in kg or other 
units    
Fruits
Qty in kg or other 
units    
Value in Shs









1. During the past 7 Days, did any of the household members eat food away from home?                 0 = No      1 = Yes 2= posho
2. If Yes to Q1, indicate the number of times they ate food away and the value of meals in the past 7days. 3= maize porridge
161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 4= meat 
5= fish 
HHD Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6 Member 7 Member 8 Member 9 Member 10 6= rice
1 Number of times 88 = Other
2 Value of meals 
3 Which *Foods does member normally eat
171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 
Member 11 Member 12 Member 13 Member 14 Member 15 Member 16 Member 17 Member 18 Member 19 Member 20
1 Number of times
2 Value of meals 
3 Which *Foods does member normally eat
1. How much does your household spend on the items listed in a typical month or year (whichever is easier)?
1 Rentals (house, land)
2 Kitchen utensils (pots, pans, plates, cutlery)
3 Household furniture (beds, tables, chairs)
4
Clothing and footwear (fabric, clothes, towels, 
shoes)
5
Electricity, Gas, Parafin, Biogas (for cooking and 
light)
6 Education, books, schoolfees, uniforms
7
Health care(consultation fees, medicines, 
spectacles)
15
Membership fees (COOP, Fmr groups, Burial 
socities, 
Section G: Food Expenditure III
SECTION H: Non-food expenditure I
CONSUMED IN TYPICAL 
MONTH
CONSUMED IN TYPICAL MONTH
11. Remittances or transfers  to 
other individuals
ENTER ZERO IF NOTHING IS 
CONSUMED
ENTER 99 IF THEY DON'T KNOW
ENTER ZERO IF NOTHING IS CONSUMED
ENTER 99 IF THEY DON'T KNOW
Food eaten away from home in the past 
7days (e.g. In schools, restaurants, during 
ceremonies)
Food eaten away from home in the past 
7days (e.g. In schools, restaurants, during 
ceremonies)
READ OUT
Member of household (maintain members and sequence as in Table E1.
Member of household (maintain members and sequence as in Table E1.
161 
Value of spending on [ITEM] in a 
typical month?
12. Repairs of machinery, 
equipment, housing
14. Public transport (Boda-boda, 
taxi, bus) 
13. Amount paid as interest, 
other fees, amagoba
8. Telephone Bills (including 
mobile)
9. Ceremonies (church, 
weddings, festivals, burials)
10. Firewood/ Charcoal
88. Other major non-food items 
(SPECIFY)
VALUE IN Shs
Value of spending on [ITEM] in 
a typical year?
162 
Value of spending on [ITEM] in 
a typical month?
Value of spending on 
[ITEM] in a typical year?





1. Provide answers to the following questions.
165 166 167 168 
Do you have access to 
this service?                  
0= No   1= Yes
 Distance to nearest 
source/service (km)
Do you have access to 
this service?               
0= No   1= Yes
 Distance to nearest 
source/service (km)
1 12. Tarred road
2 13. Bus connection to Kampala
3 14. Watering Source (livestock)
4 15. Electricity 
5 16. Water source for Household use 
6 17.Access to phone (public/private)
7 18. Access to Internet
8 19. Access to a University
9 20. Religous association
10
21. Access to a coffee nurserie run by 
fellow farmers
11 22. Micro-credit and saving facility 




3= Local Council Committee








Coffee Farmers____________________________% Certified Farmers_____________________%
170 
Role (Allow for multiple answers): 
If NO , why            
1. No extension                 2. No access to media        
88. Other 
   If YES,  what is the  source 
1 =  Farmers' group        2 = Cooperative  4 = local bank 
      5 = Exporter         6= local agrodealers    
     7= Other farmers      88 = Other 
4 = Other farmers    5 = Radio
If YES,  in which aspects of coffee production
1. Coffee growing          2. Harvesting and storing        3. Marketing        88. Other 
   If YES,  what is the  source 
 3. Not interested in credit    4= High interests rates 
Section I: Social networks I
0 = No          1 = Yes 
Financial credit
Type of service 
Hospital, clinic or Doctor
Input market for coffee
Output market for coffee 
(different from farm-gate)
169 




Access to a Secondary school
 3. Not interested in information 
Did you attend any field days or demonstrations for coffee 
I n the last 3 years?                                      0 = No                           
1 = Yes
Number of times:                                      Organized by:
Are you able to receive credit for agricultural 
production when you need such credit? If yes, indicate 
the source                    0 = No                                1 = 
Yes
1 = Extension staff    2 = Extension bulletins
6 = TV     7 = Newspaper
How many times did you interact with an extension 
officer on agricultural related issues in the last 12 months
Number of times: 
    7= fear           8= Agric is too risky     88. Other 
If NO , WHY        1. No avail source of credit       2.  No collateral 
If yes, with which bank?
5= Ignorance(no infor)   6= stringent loan conditions 
7
8
What proportion (%) of farmers grow Coffee 
and what proportion of these are Certified 
farmers?
Access to a Primary school
Did any member of this  household hold any 
a
Leadership 
Role in the community within the last 5years?           0 = 
No                                1 = Yes





Have you received training on coffee production?                             
0 = No                                                   1 = Yes
Are you able to receive agricultural information when 
you need such information?                                                                                      
0 = No                                1 = Yes
Source of coffee seedlings
Access to a Commercial Bank
Do you have a Savings Account?  0= No   1= Yes
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HHID_____________
1. Provide the following information on the participation and membership in social networks by members of this household.
















1) Information on Coffee 
2) Bulk marketing of coffee                             
3) Credit provision                                        
4) Access to markets       
5) Extension services and training                                            
6) Cash advances on produce
7) Information on other crops
88) Other_________________
2.  Provide the following information about coffee farmers that you know.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING TIME TO TALK TO US!
Type of organization 
a
Who in the household is a member
Others 
                         
If YES, do you interact with any of these farmer/s?                                                                                      
0 = No                                                    1 = Yes
a
Codes:                 
1) HH head              
2) Spouse              
3) Jointly                 
4) Parent                         




Source:                 
1) Extensn staff            
2) other farmers             
3) Media                 
4)Farmer group                          
88) Other____
What type of information do you 
certified farmer that you interact with?        exchange with this CERTIFIED  farmer 
180 
(Use the c codes above)__________________________________km
SECTION I: Social networks, cooperatives and certification II
Does any of the HHmember 
participate in the folllowing             
0=No  1= Yes
Name of the group
Specifically for Coffee
cType of service:
For how long have they been a 
member (years)
Are any of your relatives also 
members 0=No  1= Yes
How did you get to know
d
 about this 
group 
b
Leadership role of member in this 
organization          0=No  1= Yes
Are any of your neighbors also 
members 0=No  1= Yes
What 
c








Position:                   
1) Chairman                                  
2) Secretary                  
3) Treasurer                 
4 Group leader                                
88) Other (Specify)
Please list 3-4 farmers living around this neighbourhood 






If YES, what is the distance in (Km) to the nearest         
Are you aware of any relative, neighbor or farmer that 
produces Certified coffee.
179 
0 = No          1 = Yes 
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